Thomas Reid’s objection to Hume’s theory of personal identity

Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica E Modernidade 24 (2):53-69 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The paper discusses Thomas Reid's objection to David Hume's theory of personal identity. The hypothesis states that this criticism is not effective because it is based on a misunderstanding of Hume’s theory, namely, that Hume would have admitted a negative ontological thesis - the inexistence of a mind beyond perceptions - and a positive ontological thesis - a mind reduced to a bundle of perceptions. After explaining in what measures Reid’s objection is based upon this misunderstanding, the paper shows why Hume does not accept those theses,

Author's Profile

Vinícius França Freitas
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Alumnus)

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-01-16

Downloads
197 (#82,971)

6 months
101 (#63,555)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?