Reassessing the Case Against Evidential Externalism

In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper reassesses the case against Evidential Externalism, the thesis that one's evidence fails to supervene on one's non-factive mental states, focusing on two objections to Externalism due by Nicholas Silins: the armchair access argument and the supervenience argument. It also examines Silins's attempt to undermine the force of one major source of motivation for Externalism, namely that the rival Internalist picture of evidence is implicated in some central arguments for scepticism. While Silins concludes that the case against Evidential Externalism is surprisingly strong, reassessing the arguments supports the opposite conclusion; the objections to Externalism are weak, and for all Silins has shown it may well have unmatched advantages when it comes to resisting scepticism.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FRARTC-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-02-09
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-02-09

Total views
324 ( #20,026 of 2,448,958 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
48 ( #13,224 of 2,448,958 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.