The Argument from Pain: A New Argument for Indirect Realism

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The author puts forward and defends a new argument for indirect realism called the argument from pain. The argument is akin to a well-known traditional argument to the same end, the argument from hallucination. Like the latter, it contains one premise stating an analogy between veridical perceptions and certain other states and one premise stating that those states are states of acquaintance with sense-data. The crucial difference is that the states that are said to be analogous to veridical perceptions are pain-states instead of hallucinations. This difference makes the argument from pain immune to the standard objections against the argument from hallucination.
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The Transparency of Experience.Martin, Michael G. F.
Naming and Necessity.Kripke, Saul A.
Naming and Necessity.Kripke, Saul A.

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