The Dual Concepts Objection to Content Externalism

American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):123-138 (2016)
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Many philosophers have used premises about concepts and rationality to argue that the protagonists in the various Twin Earth thought experiments do not have the concepts that content externalists say they have. This essay argues that this popular internalist argument is flawed in many different ways, and more importantly it cannot be repaired in order to cast doubt on externalism.
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Latest version: 2 (2016-04-09)
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A Puzzle About Belief.Kripke, Saul A.

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