The Dual Concepts Objection to Content Externalism

American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):123-138 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Many philosophers have used premises about concepts and rationality to argue that the protagonists in the various Twin Earth thought experiments do not have the concepts that content externalists say they have. This essay argues that this popular internalist argument is flawed in many different ways, and more importantly it cannot be repaired in order to cast doubt on externalism.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2015-09-12
Latest version: 2 (2016-04-09)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
721 ( #9,207 of 69,969 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #37,383 of 69,969 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.