The Meta-Explanatory Question
Abstract
Philosophical theories of explanation characterize the difference between correct and incorrect explanations. While remaining neutral as to which of these ‘first-order’ theories is right, this paper asks the ‘meta-explanatory’ question: is the difference between correct and incorrect explanation real, i.e., objective or mind-independent? After offering a framework for distinguishing realist from anti-realist views, I sketch three distinct paths to explanatory anti-realism.
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Added to PP index
2015-09-04
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2015-09-04
Total views
175 ( #17,756 of 41,641 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #33,353 of 41,641 )
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