'Hidden Inwardness’ and ‘Subjectivity is Truth’: Kant and Kierkegaard on Moral Psychology and Religious Pragmatism

In Lee C. Barrett & Peter Ajda (eds.), Kierkegaard in Context: A Festschrift for Jon Stewart (Mercer Kierkegaard Series). Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press. pp. 112-129 (2019)
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Abstract

This chapter sketches a reconstruction of the concept of hidden inwardness that argues that the concept refers to ethico-religious characters that are expressed in deeds and words, rather than a private inner world. By relying on the distinction between morality and legality, I argue that “hidden inwardness” is not compatible with all kinds of behavior and that it is better described negatively than positively. The concept of hidden inwardness need therefore not be as problematic as is often assumed, since it mainly involves the idea that we do not know hearts and minds. Still, Kierkegaard’s later works use “hidden inwardness” in a different manner than the earlier pseudonymous writings. However, I argue that this change in use of the term involves more a change of emphasis, which prevents misuses of “hidden inwardness,” than any significant change of theoretical position. Finally, I show that “hidden inwardness” sheds light on the controversial theses “Subjectivity is truth” and “Subjectivity is untruth” in Concluding Unscientific Postscript.

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