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  1. added 2019-11-05
    Every Man Has His Price: Kant's Argument for Universal Radical Evil.Jonas Jervell Indregard - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Kant famously claims that we have all freely chosen evil. This paper offers a novel account of the much-debated justification for this claim. I reconstruct Kant’s argument from his affirmation that we all have a price – we can all succumb to temptation. I argue that this follows a priori from a theoretical principle of the Critique of Pure Reason, namely that all empirical powers have a finite, changeable degree, an intensive magnitude. Because of this, our reason can always be (...)
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  2. added 2019-11-02
    The Duty of Knowing Oneself as One Appears: A Response to Kant’s Problem of Moral Self-Knowledge.Vivek Kumar Radhakrishnan - 2019 - Problemos 96.
    A challenge to Kant’s less known duty of self-knowledge comes from his own firm view that it is impossible to know oneself. This paper resolves this problem by considering the duty of self-knowledge as involving the pursuit of knowledge of oneself as one appears in the empirical world. First, I argue that, although Kant places severe restrictions on the possibility of knowing oneself as one is, he admits the possibility of knowing oneself as one appears using methods from empirical anthropology. (...)
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  3. added 2019-06-30
    Review of Papish, Laura. Kant on Evil, Self-Deception and Moral Reform. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 280. $74.13 (Cloth). [REVIEW]Samuel J. M. Kahn - forthcoming - Ethics.
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  4. added 2019-04-12
    Kant als Mystiker? Zur These von Carl Arnold Wilmans’ dissertatio philosophica.Christian Rößner - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):7-30.
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  5. added 2019-04-01
    L'etica delle virtù: commenti a Berti.Enrico Berti - 2005 - Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics 7 (2):1-14.
    I discuss Enrico Berti “Saggezza o filosofia pratica?” published in the current issue of “Ethics & Politics”. I argue that Kant’s normative ethics was in fact a kind of virtue ethics and most of the opposition between Aristotelianism and Kantian ethics in the last three decades has been basically an exercise in cross-purpose.
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  6. added 2018-09-21
    Evil, Virtue, and Education in Kant.Paul Formosa - 2019 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 51 (13):1325-1334.
    For Kant, we cannot understand how to approach moral education without confronting the radical evil of humanity. But if we start out, as Kant thinks we do, from a morally corrupt state, how...
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  7. added 2018-09-21
    Kant's Conception of Personal Autonomy.Paul Formosa - 2013 - Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (3):193-212.
    A strong distinction is often made between personal autonomy and moral autonomy. Personal autonomy involves governing yourself in the pursuit of your own conception of the good. Moral autonomy involves legislating the moral law for yourself. Viewed in this way personal autonomy seems at best marginal and at worst a positive hindrance to moral autonomy, since personal autonomy can conflict with moral autonomy. Given that Kantian approaches to morality are closely aligned with moral autonomy, does that mean that the Kantian (...)
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  8. added 2018-09-20
    Kant on Moral Satisfaction.Michael Walschots - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (2):281-303.
    This paper gives an account of Kant’s concept of self-contentment (Selbstzufriedenheit), i.e. the satisfaction involved in the performance of moral action. This concept is vulnerable to an important objection: if moral action is satisfying, it might only ever be performed for the sake of this satisfaction. I explain Kant’s response to this objection and argue that it is superior to Francis Hutcheson’s response to a similar objection. I conclude by showing that two other notions of moral satisfaction in Kant’s moral (...)
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  9. added 2018-03-07
    Kant's Theory of Motivation: A Hybrid Approach.Benjamin S. Yost - 2017 - Review of Metaphysics 71 (2):293-319.
    To vindicate morality against skeptical doubts, Kant must show that agents can be moved to act independently of their sensible desires. Kant must therefore answer a motivational question: how does an agent get from the cognition that she ought to act morally to acting morally? Affectivist interpretations of Kant hold that agents are moved to act by feelings, while intellectualists appeal to cognition alone. To overcome the significant shortcomings of each view, I develop a hybrid theory of motivation. My central (...)
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  10. added 2018-03-03
    Kant and the Duty to Promote One’s Own Happiness.Samuel Kahn - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
    In his discussion of the duty of benevolence in §27 of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that agents have no obligation to promote their own happiness, for ‘this happens unavoidably’ (MS, AA 6:451). In this paper I argue that Kant should not have said this. I argue that Kant should have conceded that agents do have an obligation to promote their own happiness.
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  11. added 2018-02-12
    Sublimity and Joy: Kant on the Aesthetic Constitution of Virtue.Melissa Merritt - 2017 - In Matthew Altman (ed.), The Palgrave Kant Handbook. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 447-467.
    This chapter argues that Kant’s aesthetic theory of the sublime has particular relevance for his ethics of virtue. Kant contends that our readiness to revel in natural sublimity depends upon a background commitment to moral ends. Further lessons about the emotional register of the sublime allow us to understand how Kant can plausibly contend that the temperament of virtue is both sublime and joyous at the same time.
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  12. added 2017-11-10
    Love, Respect, and Individuals: Murdoch as a Guide to Kantian Ethics.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1844-1863.
    I reconsider the relation between love and respect in Kantian ethics, taking as my guide Iris Murdoch's view of love as the fundamental moral attitude and a kind of attention to individuals. It is widely supposed that Kantian ethics disregards individuals, since we don't respect individuals but the universal quality of personhood they instantiate. We need not draw this conclusion if we recognise that Kant and Murdoch share a view about the centrality of love to virtue. We can then see (...)
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  13. added 2017-10-17
    Kant's Apathology of Compassion.Wolfram Bergande - 2014 - In Louis Schreel (ed.), Schreel, Louis (Ed.): Pathology & Aesthetics. Essays on the Pathological in Kant and Contemporary Aesthetics. Duesseldorf, Germany: Duesseldorf University Press. pp. 11-47.
    In his critical and his later work, Kant recommends apathy to the moral agent faced with pathological phenomena. Notoriously, Kant even rejects compassion (Mitleiden) as pathological. A deconstruction of Kant's 'apathology', i.e. of his systematic treatment of compassion, reveals disgust as quasi-transcendental affect at the roots of the moral agent's apathy.
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  14. added 2017-07-21
    Kant’s Theory of Conscience.Samuel J. M. Kahn - 2015 - In Pablo Muchnik & Oliver Thorndike (eds.), Rethinking Kant: Volume IV. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 135-156.
    In this paper I discuss Kant’s theory of conscience. In particular, I explicate the following two claims that Kant makes in the Metaphysics of Morals: (1) an erring conscience is an absurdity and (2) if an agent has acted according to his/her conscience, then s/he has done all that can be required of him/her. I argue that (1) is a very specific claim that does not bear on the problem of moral knowledge. I argue that (2) rests on a strongly (...)
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  15. added 2017-07-21
    Freedom, Morality, and the Propensity to Evil.Samuel J. M. Kahn - 2014 - Kantian Studies Online:65-90.
    In Book I of the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason Kant offers an explanation of freedom and moral good and evil that is different from that offered in the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals. My primary goal in this paper is to analyze and elucidate this new theory. My secondary goal is to contrast this new theory with the older one that it is replacing. I argue that the new theory, which centers on the idea that evil (...)
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  16. added 2017-06-10
    Autonomy and Morality: A Self-Determination Theory Discussion of Ethics.Alexios Arvanitis - 2017 - New Ideas in Psychology 47:57-61.
    Kantian ethics is based on a metaphysical conception of autonomy that may seem difficult to reconcile with the empirically-based science of psychology. I argue that, although not formally developed, a Self-Determination Theory (SDT) perspective of ethics can broaden the field of Kantian-based moral psychology and specify what it means, motivationally, to have autonomy in the application of a moral norm. More specifically, I argue that this is possible when a moral norm is fully endorsed by the self through a process (...)
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  17. added 2017-02-28
    Practical Action – First Critique Foundations.Adrian M. S. Piper - 2010 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 495-538.
    Both European and Anglo-American philosophical traditions of Kant scholarship draw a sharp distinction between Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophies. They cite KrV, A 14.23 –28; KrV, A 15.01– 09; KrV, B 28.22 – 28; KrV, B 29.01 –12 as evidence that the analyses of intuition, understanding and reason proffered in the first Critique apply to cognition only, and therefore do not significantly illuminate his analyses of inclination, desire, or respect for the moral law in the Groundwork, second Critique, Metaphysics of (...)
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  18. added 2016-12-08
    Kant's Taxonomy of the Emotions.Kelly D. Sorensen - 2002 - Kantian Review 6:109-128.
    If there is to be any progress in the debate about what sort of positive moral status Kant can give the emotions, we need a taxonomy of the terms Kant uses for these concepts. It used to be thought that Kant had little room for emotions in his ethics. In the past three decades, Marcia Baron, Paul Guyer, Barbara Herman, Nancy Sherman, Allen Wood and others have argued otherwise. Contrary to what a cursory reading of the Groundwork may indicate, Kant (...)
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  19. added 2016-03-23
    The Guise of the Objectively Good.Samuel Kahn - 2013 - Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (1-2):87-99.
    According to one influential version of the derivation of Kant’s Formula of Humanity, the following claim is true: Agents necessarily represent their ends as objectively good. In this paper I argue that there is good reason to regard GOG as false. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I explain what is at stake in arguing that GOG is false. In the second, I explicate the terminology in this claim. I also contrast the claim with other possible (...)
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  20. added 2016-02-17
    Rational Beings with Emotional Needs: The Patient-Centered Grounds of Kant's Duty of Humanity.Tyler Paytas - 2015 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 32 (4):353-376.
    Over the course of the past several decades, Kant scholars have made significant headway in showing that emotions play a more significant role in Kant's ethics than has traditionally been assumed. Closer attention has been paid to the Metaphysics of Morals (MS) where Kant provides important insights about the value of moral sentiments and the role they should play in our lives. One particularly important discussion occurs in sections 34 and 35 of the Doctrine of Virtue where Kant claims we (...)
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  21. added 2015-11-25
    Practical Reason and Respect for Persons.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (1):53-79.
    My project is to reconsider the Kantian conception of practical reason. Some Kantians think that practical reasoning must be more active than theoretical reasoning, on the putative grounds that such reasoning need not contend with what is there anyway, independently of its exercise. Behind that claim stands the thesis that practical reason is essentially efficacious. I accept the efficacy principle, but deny that it underwrites this inference about practical reason. My inquiry takes place against the background of recent Kantian metaethical (...)
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  22. added 2015-09-21
    Review: Clewis, The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom[REVIEW]Melissa McBay Merritt - 2010 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):529-532.
    Review of Robert Clewis, _The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom_.
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  23. added 2015-09-17
    Reconsidering RGV, AA 06: 26n and the Meaning of ‘Humanity’.Samuel Kahn - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 307-316.
    At 6:26n Kant famously (or infamously) claims that humanity and personality are not necessarily coextensional. This claim has been characterized in the secondary literature as Kant's worst mistake and as an unnecessary repudiation of his earlier (and more plausible) ethical thought. I argue that this characterization of 6:26n rests on a misinterpretation of the term `humanity'. I try to show that Kant's claim at 6:26n not only is not problematic; it constitutes a powerful reminder of the kind of epistemic modesty (...)
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  24. added 2015-09-07
    Kant on the Limits of Human Evil.Paul Formosa - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:189-214.
    Kant has often been accused of being far too “optimistic” when it comes to the extremes of evil that humans can perpetrate upon one another. In particular, Kant’s supposed claim that humans cannot choose evil qua evil has struck many people as simply false. Another problem for Kant, or perhaps the same problem in another guise, is his supposed claim that all evil is done for the sake of self-love. While self-love might be a plausible way to explain some instances (...)
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  25. added 2015-08-28
    Motive and Rightness in Kant's Ethical System.Mark Timmons - 2002 - In Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Some contemporary intepreters of Kant maintain that on Kant's view fulfilling duties of virtue require doing so from the motive of duty. I argue that there are interpretive and doctinal reasons for rejecting this interpretation. However, I argue that for Kant motives can be deontically relevant; one's motives can affect the deontic status of actions.
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  26. added 2015-08-28
    Decision Procedures, Moral Criteria, and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions in Kant's Ethics.Mark Timmons - 1997 - In B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka & Jan C. Joerdan (eds.), Jahrbuch Für Recht Und Ethik. Duncker Und Humblot.
    I argue that the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative is best interpreted as a test or decision procedure of moral rightness and not as a criterion intended to explain the deontic status of actions. Rather, the Humanity formulation is best interpreted as a moral criterion. I also argue that because the role of a moral criterion is to explain, and thus specify what makes an action right or wrong, Kant's Humanity formulation yields a theory of relevant descriptions.
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  27. added 2015-07-19
    Kant on Virtue and the Virtues.Thomas E. Hill & Adam Cureton - 2014 - In Nancy Snow (ed.), Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives From Philosophy, Theology, And Psychology. Oxford: pp. 87-110.
    Immanuel Kant is known for his ideas about duty and morally worthy acts, but his conception of virtue is less familiar. Nevertheless Kant’s understanding of virtue is quite distinctive and has considerable merit compared to the most familiar conceptions. Kant also took moral education seriously, writing extensively on both the duty of adults to cultivate virtue and the empirical conditions to prepare children for this life-long responsibility. Our aim is, first, to explain Kant’s conception of virtue, second, to highlight some (...)
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  28. added 2015-07-07
    Morality is its Own Reward.E. Sonny Elizondo - 2016 - Kantian Review 21 (3):343-365.
    Traditionally, Kantian ethics has been thought hostile to agents' well-being. Recent commentators have rightly called this view into question, but they do not push their challenge far enough. For they leave in place a fundamental assumption on which the traditional view rests, viz., that happiness is all there is to well-being. This assumption is important, since, combined with Kant’s rationalism about morality and empiricism about happiness, it implies that morality and well-being are at best extrinsically related. Since morality can only (...)
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  29. added 2014-12-28
    The Terrorist Attacks in Norway, July 22nd 2011— Some Kantian Reflections.Helga Varden - 2014 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 49 (3-4):236-259.
    This paper provides a Kantian interpretation of core issues involved in the trial following the terrorist attacks that struck Norway on July 22nd 2011. After a sketch of the controversies surrounding the trial itself, a Kantian theory of why the wrongdoer’s mind struck us as so endlessly disturbed is presented. This Kantian theory, I proceed by arguing, also helps us understand why it was so important to respond to the violence through the legal system and to treat the perpetrator, Anders (...)
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  30. added 2014-09-11
    More Than a Feeling.E. Sonny Elizondo - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):425-442.
    According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. Drawing (...)
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  31. added 2013-11-05
    Rational Hope, Moral Order, and the Revolution of the Will.Andrew Chignell - 2013 - In Eric Watkins (ed.), Divine Order, Human Order, and the Order of Nature.
    In this paper I sketch out one of the most important conditions on rational hope, and argue that Kant embraced a version of it. I go on to suggest that we can use this analysis to solve a longstanding 'conundrum' in Kant's ethics and religion regarding the nature of the individual moral revolution. -/- .
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  32. added 2013-10-29
    Appetimus Sub Ratione Boni: Kant’s Practical Principles Between Crusius and Leibniz.David Forman - 2013 - In Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. de Gruyter. pp. 323-334.
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  33. added 2013-10-04
    The Idea of Freedom and Moral Cognition in Groundwork III.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):555-589.
    Kant’s views on the relation between freedom and moral law seem to undergo a major, unannounced shift. In the third section of the Groundwork, Kant seems to be using the fact that we must act under the idea of freedom as a foundation for the moral law. However, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that our awareness of our freedom depends on our awareness of the moral law. I argue that the apparent conflict between the two texts depends (...)
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  34. added 2013-06-28
    From Discipline and Autonomy: Kant's Theory of Moral Development.Paul Formosa - 2011 - In Klas Roth & Chris W. Surprenant (eds.), Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. New York: Routledge. pp. 163--176.
    In this paper I argue that Kant develops, in a number of texts, a detailed three stage theory of moral development which resembles the contemporary accounts of moral development defended by Lawrence Kohlberg and John Rawls. The first stage in this process is that of physical education and disciplining, followed by cultivating and civilising, with a third and final stage of moralising. The outcome of this process of moral development is a fully autonomous person. However, Kant’s account of moral development (...)
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  35. added 2013-04-22
    Kant on Moral Sensibility and Moral Motivation.Owen Ware - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (4):727-746.
    Despite Kant’s lasting influence on philosophical accounts of moral motivation, many details of his own position remain elusive. In the Critique of Practical Reason, for example, Kant argues that our recognition of the moral law’s authority must elicit both painful and pleasurable feelings in us. On reflection, however, it is unclear how these effects could motivate us to act from duty. As a result, Kant’s theory of moral sensibility comes under a skeptical threat: the possibility of a morally motivating feeling (...)
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  36. added 2012-10-11
    A Life Without Affects and Passions: Kant on the Duty of Apathy.Paul Formosa - 2011 - Parrhesia 13:96-111.
    An apathetic life is not the sort of life that most of us would want for ourselves or believe that we have a duty to strive for. And yet Kant argues that we have a duty of apathy, a duty to strive to be without affects (Affecten) and passions (Leidenschaften). But is Kant’s claim that there is a duty of apathy really as problematic as it sounds? In arguing that it is not, this paper investigates in detail in Kant’s accounts (...)
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  37. added 2012-04-24
    The Moral Source of the Kantian Sublime.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2012 - In Timothy Costelloe (ed.), The Sublime: From Antiquity to the Present (pp. 37-49). Cambridge University Press.
    A crucial feature of Kant's critical-period writing on the sublime is its grounding in moral psychology. Whereas in the pre-critical writings, the sublime is viewed as an inherently exhausting state of mind, in the critical-period writings it is presented as one that gains strength the more it is sustained. I account for this in terms of Kantian moral psychology, and explain that, for Kant, sound moral disposition is conceived as a sublime state of mind.
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