Evidence Through a Glass, Darkly

Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):56-61 (2021)
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ABSTRACT Dormandy’s ‘True Faith’ presents two views on the proper epistemological stance towards faith: doxastic-partialism and evidentialism. Here, I argue for a third option that cuts across the evidentialism/partialism distinction. I first analyze the Pascalian conception of faith, arguing that Pascal begins with the cognitive attitude of acceptance rather than belief. Next, I discuss Dormandy’s case for evidentialism, and contend that some evidence—the kind gained through transformative experiences—presents a difficulty for her argument. Finally, I offer my proposed view—Partialist Evidentialism—and argue that this approach is necessary for acquiring some unique kinds of evidence for religious faith.

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Megan Fritts
University of Arkansas, Little Rock


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