No need to know

Philosophical Studies 174 (2):391-401 (2017)
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Abstract
I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.
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First archival date: 2016-04-23
Latest version: 2 (2017-12-15)
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2016-04-23

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