The Ethics of Putting Things Into Perspective

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This paper looks into the ethics of positive perspective-taking. Positive perspective-taking is, roughly, an attitudinal orientation toward an object that treats that object as sufficiently good, or in other words, as meeting one’s normative expectations. Sometimes, positive perspective-taking is both prudent and virtuous. But sometimes, positive perspective-taking–especially about injustices done to others–seems morally suspicious. When is positive perspective-taking actually morally problematic, and in those cases, what is the nature of the moral problem? I argue that a complete answer to this question should appeal to moral rights: on my view, we sometimes have moral rights against others’ putting our problems into a positive perspective. A central advantage of this proposal is its ability to account for the moral asymmetry between positive perspective-taking about injustices done to oneself and positive perspective-taking about injustices done to others.

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James Fritz
Virginia Commonwealth University

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