Well-Being and Moral Constraints: A Modified Subjectivist Account

Philosophia:1-25 (forthcoming)
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In this paper, I argue that a modified version of well-being subjectivism can avoid the standard, yet unintuitive, conclusion that morally horrible acts may contribute to an agent’s well-being. To make my case, I argue that “Modified Subjectivists” need not accept such conclusions about well-being so long as they accept the following three theoretical addenda: 1) there are a plurality of values pertaining to well-being, 2) there are some objective goods, even if they do not directly contribute to well-being, and 3) some of these values and goods (from 1 and 2) are bound-up with one another.
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Archival date: 2022-06-03
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