Default Assumption, Hinge Commitment and the Closure Principle

Journal of Dialectics of Nature 42 (5):17-22 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper focuses on a potential problem with Sosa’s theory of default assumption, viz., the alleged incompatibility of this theory with the closure principle. Given the similarity between the notion of default assumption and Wittgenstein’s notion of hinge commitment, I suggest that two influential hinge epistemologies including Wright’s entitlement theory and Pritchard’s non-belief theory provide resources for possible solutions to the problem. I argue that default assumption should be classified as acceptance and hence as a non-doxastic propositional attitude. Sosa’s theory can deal with the apparent incompatibility with the closure principle by adopting the solution of the non-belief theory, while also avoiding problems affecting the latter view.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-07-27
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
46 ( #52,349 of 2,427,987 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #42,547 of 2,427,987 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.