Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment

In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Springer Verlag (2018)
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Abstract
Moral encroachment holds that the epistemic justification of a belief can be affected by moral factors. If the belief might wrong a person or group more evidence is required to justify the belief. Moral encroachment thereby opposes evidentialism, and kindred views, which holds that epistemic justification is determined solely by factors pertaining to evidence and truth. In this essay I explain how beliefs such as ‘that woman is probably an administrative assistant’—based on the evidence that most women employees at the firm are administrative assistants—motivate moral encroachment. I then describe weaknesses of moral encroachment. Finally I explain how we can countenance the moral properties of such beliefs without endorsing moral encroachment, and I argue that the moral status of such beliefs cannot be evaluated independently from the understanding in which they are embedded.
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Archival date: 2017-12-23
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Elusive Knowledge.Lewis, David K.

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Justification, Knowledge, and Normality.Littlejohn, Clayton & Dutant, Julien

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