Freedom and Unpredictability

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (6):666-680 (2013)
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Abstract

In A Metaphysics for Freedom, Helen Steward proposes and defends a novel version of the libertarian account of free action. Amongst several objections that she considers to her view, one that looms particularly large is the Challenge from Chance: ‘the most powerful, widely-promulgated and important line of anti-libertarian reasoning’. This paper begins by arguing that Steward’s response to the Challenge is not fully convincing. It then goes on to explore a further possible libertarian line of defence against the Challenge, arguing that it, too, ultimately fails. The conclusion is that the Challenge remains an important source of dialectical advantage for the compatibilist.

Author's Profile

Michael Garnett
King's College London

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