Shit Happens

Episteme 4 (2):205-218 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Abstract In this paper I embrace what Brian Keeley calls in “Of Conspiracy Theories” the absurdist horn of the dilemma for philosophers who criticize such theories. I thus defend the view that there is indeed something deeply epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. My complaint is that conspiracy theories apply intentional explanations to situations that give rise to special problems concerning the elimination of competing intentional explanations

Author's Profile

Pete Mandik
William Paterson University of New Jersey

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
865 (#14,395)

6 months
173 (#13,989)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?