Searle on Perception

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Abstract
In the course of his discussion of perception, Searle criticizes representative theories in general. In this paper I will argue that, even though his criticisms may be adequate regarding a certain form of these theories, perhaps the most frequently defended by philosophers of perception, a version I will outline here scapes to them. A second issue I raise concerns Searle’s claim that his theory of perception is a form of direct realism. I will raise difficulties for Searle’s attempt to maintain at the same time a “token-reflexive” theory of perception and the thesis of direct realism.
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Archival date: 2016-05-01
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2010-11-17

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