Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence

In James Chase & David Coady (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. Routledge (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In order to perform certain actions – such as incarcerating a person or revoking parental rights – the state must establish certain facts to a particular standard of proof. These standards – such as preponderance of evidence and beyond reasonable doubt – are often interpreted as likelihoods or epistemic confidences. Many theorists construe them numerically; beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often construed as 90 to 95% confidence in the guilt of the defendant. A family of influential cases suggests standards of proof should not be interpreted numerically. These ‘proof paradoxes’ illustrate that purely statistical evidence can warrant high credence in a disputed fact without satisfying the relevant legal standard. In this essay I evaluate three influential attempts to explain why merely statistical evidence cannot satisfy legal standards.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GARTBO-6
Revision history
First archival date: 2017-12-23
Latest version: 2 (2018-02-21)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2017-12-23

Total views
350 ( #8,572 of 40,626 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
196 ( #1,866 of 40,626 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.