Peirce on Vital Matters and the Scientific Method

In Robert B. Talisse, Paniel Reyes Cárdenas & Daniel Herbert (eds.), Pragmatic Reason: Christopher Hookway and the American Philosophical Tradition. London: Routledge. pp. 95-111 (2023)
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Abstract

In this paper, I try to make sense of some puzzling claims that Peirce makes in the Cambridge conferences lectures. I identify four tasks that a successful interpretation of those claims must accomplish. First, we must provide a plausible reading of the “no belief in science” thesis. Second, we must provide a compelling interpretation of the “no science in vital matters” thesis. Third, we must explain Peirce’s distinction between two forms of holding for true. Fourth, we should be able to solve the conflict with “The fixation of belief.” I start by analysing Christopher Hookway’s reading of Peirce’s claims because he clearly identifies these tasks and offers an interpretation with considerable merits. However, I identify a problem in Hookway’s reading, since he fails to account for a normative dimension of the “no science in vital matters” thesis. Finally, I sketch my attempt to accomplish these four tasks while also avoiding this latter problem.

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Gabriele Gava
University of Turin

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