Realismus und unübersetzbare Sprachen

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Abstract
This paper argues against Davidson’s claim that there is no distinction between conceptual schemes and their content and derives the implications for the debate on realism and antirealism. Starting from a semantic conception of realism, I discuss Davidson’s argument against conceptual schemes and untranslatable languages. I argue that the idea of an untranslatable language is consistent since language attribution is essentially normative. Untranslatable languages are metaphysically possible, but epistemically unrecognizable. This leads to a Berkeleyan argument against antirealism: if antirealism is conceived of as dependence from a total language (instead of merely some actual language), the distinction between realism and antirealism vanishes: antirealism is realism.
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Archival date: 2019-10-09
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Brainstorms.Dennett, Daniel
Zettel.Wittgenstein, Ludwig
Realism and Truth.Devitt, Michael
Cartesianische Meditationen Und Pariser Vorträge.Husserl, Edmund & Strasser, Stephan

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2018-12-08

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