Moral twin-earth and semantic moral realism

Erkenntnis 62 (3):353-378 (2005)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Mark Timmons and Terry Horgan have argued that the new moral realism, which rests on the causal theory of reference, is untenable. While I do agree that the new moral realism is untenable, I do not think that Timmons and Horgan have succeeded in showing that it is. I will lay out the case for new moral realism and Horgan and Timmons’ argument against it, and then argue that their argument fails. Further, I will discuss Boyd’s semantic theory as well as attempts to improve upon it, raise serious problems for these semantic accounts, and suggest an alternative view that accounts for our use of moral terms.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GEIMTA
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-10-23
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
398 ( #11,993 of 53,517 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #36,808 of 53,517 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.