There is an important difference between a thought that is directed towards a particular object and a thought that is not so directed. For example, there is a difference in my thoughts about my brother, and my thoughts about brothers, more generally. The first has the earmarks of singular thought, while the latter does not. After showing that there is no agreement about the nature of singular thought, I revisit early Russell to find greater clarity. I then advance a version (...) of Millianism that builds on early Russell’s view of singular thought. I argue that the advocates of the direct reference view who argue that being on the receiving end of a name is suffi cient for having singular thoughts about the object named have not provided good reasons for their views. Passing on a name can provide the recipient with a general understanding of the name, but not specific understanding. That is, when acquiring the name, the recipient may not learn the identity of the object named as this very object which, I argue, is required for one having singular thoughts of that object. (shrink)

This paper argues that conceptual engineering comes in many guises, often depending on what type of concept is being engineered. Engineering a classical concept, one that stems from Plato and Frege, is very different from engineering, e.g., a prototype concept or an exemplar concept. The former are abstract and have necessary and sufficient satisfaction conditions. The latter, on the other hand, can and do differ from one person to the next and thus have the earmarks of conceptions. While it is (...) tempting to argue that classical concepts are of natural kinds while prototype and/or exemplar concepts are of socially constructed kinds, the paper argues that such classification is not tenable. Many of our concepts of natural kinds are prototype concepts, and many socially constructed kinds are specified with necessary and sufficient conditions and so are have the earmarks of classical concepts. While the discussion of conceptual engineering has mostly focused on classical concepts and how scholars can, do, and perhaps should ameliorate them, the paper emphasizes the importance of other types of concepts and how they can be engineered. (shrink)

I argue that Frege's puzzle can extend beyond semantics and to, for example, pictures and scent. Accordingly, attempted solutions to the puzzle should not focus solely on semantics. Solutions that do so can at best provide a partial solution to the puzzle. They will not provide a solution that explains the broader phenomenon, including the one where I, as a child, learned the identity of Clark Kent and Superman without possessing their names. Below I will provide a solution that accounts (...) for the typical Frege case as well as my childhood case. The solution will, accordingly, not be a semantic solution. Instead it will focus on information we have on objects and how we organize and access the information. The solution I will provide is psychological and not semantic in nature. At the same time I will show that the solution I provide aligns itself well with Millianism. (shrink)

Horgan and Timmons have argued that our intuitions about the semantics of non-moral language and moral language differ, and that while twin-earth semantic intuitions generate one result in Putnam´s twater case, moral twin-earth fails to generate comparable results for moral terms. Horgan and Timmon´s conclude from this that the semantic norms governing the use of natural kind terms differ from the semantic norms governing the use of moral terms. I will argue that Horgan and Timmons’ intuitive moral twin-earth argument fails (...) to derail the new moral realism. Further, I will discuss Boyd’s semantic theory and raise problems for it that do not rely on the use of moral twin-earth. (shrink)

Mark Timmons and Terry Horgan have argued that the new moral realism, which rests on the causal theory of reference, is untenable. While I do agree that the new moral realism is untenable, I do not think that Timmons and Horgan have succeeded in showing that it is. I will lay out the case for new moral realism and Horgan and Timmons’ argument against it, and then argue that their argument fails. Further, I will discuss Boyd’s semantic theory as well (...) as attempts to improve upon it, raise serious problems for these semantic accounts, and suggest an alternative view that accounts for our use of moral terms. (shrink)

Most of the historically salient versions of the Cosmological Argument rest on two assumptions. The first assumption is that some contingeney (i.e., contingent fact) is such that a necessity is required to explain it. Against that assumption we will argue that necessities alone cannot explain any contingency and, furthermore, that it is impossible to explain the totality of contingencies at all.The second assumption is the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Against the Principle of Sufficient Reason we will argue that it is (...) unreasonable to require, as the Principle of Sufficient Reason does, that any given whole of contingent facts has an explanation. Instead, it depends on the results of empirical investigation whether or not one should ask for an explanation of the given whole.We argue that if a cosmological argument invokes either of the two assumptions, then it fails to prove that a necessity is needed to explain the universe of contingent facts. (shrink)

Horgan and Timmons, with their Moral Twin Earth arguments, argue that the new moral realism falls prey to either objectionable relativism or referential indeterminacy. The Moral Twin Earth thought experiment on which the arguments are based relies in crucial ways on the use of intuitions. First, it builds on Putnam’s well-known Twin Earth example and the conclusions drawn from that about the meaning of kind names. Further, it relies on the intuition that were Earthers and Twin Earthers to meet, they (...) would be able to have genuine moral disagreements. I will argue that the similarities with Putnam’s thought experiment are questionable and so the reliance on Putnam-like intuitions is questionable. I will then further argue that even if we accept the intuitions that Horgan and Timmons rely on, the anti-realist conclusion is not warranted due to there being more to the meaning of kind terms than the argument assumes. Once we develop the meaning of kind terms further we can acknowledge both that Earthers and Twin Earthers refer to different properties with their moral terms, and that in spite of that they can have a substantive disagreement due to a shared meaning component. (shrink)

The entry provides an overview of current (2021) theories of reference as well as bibliographical information about the key books and/or articles that discuss each theory.

One of the issues that has been hotly discussed in connection with the direct designation theory is whether or not coreferential names can be substituted salva veritate in epistemic contexts. Some direct designation theorists believe that they can be so substituted. Some direct designation theorists and all Fregeans and neo-Fregeans believe that they cannot be so substituted. Fregeans of various stripes have used their intuition against free substitution to argue against the direct designation theory. Some direct designation theorists have used (...) the same intuitions to argue against the view that belief reports of simple declarative sentences can be accounted for with singular propositions. This paper has two main goals; first, to show that the discussion of the issue has tended to treat all epistemic contexts equally, and second, to argue that we should not treat substitutions in contexts that involve justification (and hence knowledge) in the same way as we treat substitution in simple belief contexts, i.e., contexts that just involve the belief relation. (shrink)