Moral twin earth: The intuitive argument

Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (1):115-124 (2003)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Horgan and Timmons have argued that our intuitions about the semantics of non-moral language and moral language differ, and that while twin-earth semantic intuitions generate one result in Putnam´s twater case, moral twin-earth fails to generate comparable results for moral terms. Horgan and Timmon´s conclude from this that the semantic norms governing the use of natural kind terms differ from the semantic norms governing the use of moral terms. I will argue that Horgan and Timmons’ intuitive moral twin-earth argument fails to derail the new moral realism. Further, I will discuss Boyd’s semantic theory and raise problems for it that do not rely on the use of moral twin-earth.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-10-23
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
294 ( #23,558 of 65,601 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #39,433 of 65,601 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.