Pragmatic Encroachment and the Challenge from Epistemic Injustice

Philosophers' Imprint (forthcoming)
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Abstract
The article consists in an argument that pragmatic encroachment theories of knowledge face difficulty in accounting for paradigmatic cases of discriminatory epistemic injustice as such. This challenge is a fairly unusual one that proceeds from moral judgments to an epistemological conclusion. The basic idea is, roughly, that in some cases, a knowing subject is wronged by being regarded as lacking knowledge due to social identity prejudices. But pragmatic encroachers appear to be committed to the view that the subject does not know in such cases. So, given that the cases in question are standardly diagnosed as instances of discriminatory epistemic injustice, pragmatic encroachment appears to be incapable of accounting for an important type of injustice.
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Archival date: 2019-01-08
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2019-01-08

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