Laws and the Completeness of the Fundamental

In Mark Jago (ed.), Reality Making. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 11-37 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Any explanation of one fact in terms of another will appeal to some sort of connection between the two. In a causal explanation, the connection might be a causal mechanism or law. But not all explanations are causal, and neither are all explanatory connections. For example, in explaining the fact that a given barn is red in terms of the fact that it is crimson, we might appeal to a non-causal connection between things’ being crimson and their being red. Many such connections, like this one, are general rather than particular. I call these general non-causal explanatory connections 'laws of metaphysics'. In this paper I argue that some of these laws are to be found in the world at its most fundamental level, forming a bridge between fundamental reality and everything else. It is only by admitting fundamental laws, I suggest, that we can do justice to the explanatory relationship between what is fundamental and what is not. And once these laws are admitted, we are able to provide a nice resolution of the puzzle of why there are any non-fundamental facts in the first place.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years
2016
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GLALAT
Upload history
First archival date: 2015-03-30
Latest version: 2 (2018-06-02)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2015-02-09

Total views
406 ( #13,582 of 58,210 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
33 ( #23,441 of 58,210 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.