Laws and the Completeness of the Fundamental

In Mark Jago (ed.), Reality Making. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 11-37 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Any explanation of one fact in terms of another will appeal to some sort of connection between the two. In a causal explanation, the connection might be a causal mechanism or law. But not all explanations are causal, and neither are all explanatory connections. For example, in explaining the fact that a given barn is red in terms of the fact that it is crimson, we might appeal to a non-causal connection between things’ being crimson and their being red. Many such connections, like this one, are general rather than particular. I call these general non-causal explanatory connections 'laws of metaphysics'. In this paper I argue that some of these laws are to be found in the world at its most fundamental level, forming a bridge between fundamental reality and everything else. It is only by admitting fundamental laws, I suggest, that we can do justice to the explanatory relationship between what is fundamental and what is not. And once these laws are admitted, we are able to provide a nice resolution of the puzzle of why there are any non-fundamental facts in the first place.
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2015-03-30
Latest version: 2 (2018-06-02)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
516 ( #14,037 of 69,149 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #21,290 of 69,149 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.