The difference between epistemic and metaphysical necessity

Synthese 198 (Suppl 6):1409-1424 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Philosophers have observed that metaphysical necessity appears to be a true or real or genuine form of necessity while epistemic necessity does not. Similarly, natural necessity appears genuine while deontic necessity does not. But what is it for a form of necessity to be genuine? I defend an account of genuine necessity in explanatory terms. The genuine forms of necessity, I argue, are those that provide what I call necessitarianexplanation. I discuss the relationship of necessitarian explanation to ground.

Author's Profile

Martin Glazier
University of Geneva

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-06-02

Downloads
814 (#8,699)

6 months
172 (#2,917)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?