Identifying mental states: A celebrated hypothesis refuted

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GOLIMS
Revision history
Archival date: 2009-08-02
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Matter and Consciousness.Churchland, Paul M.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
484 ( #4,681 of 37,972 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
29 ( #12,960 of 37,972 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.