Identifying mental states: A celebrated hypothesis refuted
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62 (1994)
Abstract
Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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Archival date: 2009-08-02
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2009-01-28
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633 ( #10,752 of 69,141 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #60,057 of 69,141 )
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