Intersubjective properties by which we specify pain, pleasure, and other kinds of mental states
Philosophy 75 (291):89-104 (2000)
Abstract
By what types of properties do we specify twinges, toothaches, and other kinds of mental states? Wittgenstein considers two methods. Procedure one, direct, private acquaintance: A person connects a word to the sensation it specifies through noticing what that sensation is like in his own experience. Procedure two, outward signs: A person pins his use of a word to outward, pre-verbal signs of the sensation. I identify and explain a third procedure and show we in fact specify many kinds of mental states in this way.
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2009-01-28
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19 ( #35,762 of 58,248 )
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