McDowell’s disjunctivism and other minds
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):277-292 (2011)
Abstract
John McDowell’s original motivation of disjunctivism occurs in the context of a problem regarding other minds. Recent commentators have insisted that McDowell’s disjunctivism should be classed as an epistemological disjunctivism about epistemic warrant, and distinguished from the perceptual disjunctivism of Hinton, Snowdon and others. In this paper I investigate the relation between the problem of other minds and disjunctivism, and raise some questions for this interpretation of McDowell.
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2010-06-09
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672 ( #7,129 of 58,283 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
70 ( #9,834 of 58,283 )
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