Results for 'Disjunctivism'

92 found
Order:
See also
  1. Epistemological Disjunctivism and its Representational Commitments.Craig French - 2019 - In Duncan Pritchard, Casey Doyle & Joe Milburn (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. London: Routledge.
    Orthodox epistemological disjunctivism involves the idea that paradigm cases of visual perceptual knowledge are based on visual perceptual states which are propositional, and hence representational. Given this, the orthodox version of epistemological disjunctivism takes on controversial representational commitments in the philosophy of perception. Must epistemological disjunctivism involve these commitments? I don’t think so. Here I argue that we can take epistemological disjunctivism in a new direction and develop a version of the view free of these representational (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. Two Forms of Memory Knowledge and Epistemological Disjunctivism.Joe Milburn & Andrew Moon - forthcoming - In Casey Doyle, Joe Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. Routledge.
    In our paper, we distinguish between two forms of memory knowledge: experiential memory knowledge and stored memory knowledge. We argue that, mutatis mutandis, the case that Pritchard makes for epistemological disjunctivism regarding perceptual knowledge can be made for epistemological disjunctivism regarding experiential memory knowledge. At the same time, we argue against a disjunctivist account of stored memory knowledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Epistemological Disjunctivism and the New Evil Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):61-70.
    In common with traditional forms of epistemic internalism, epistemological disjunctivism attempts to incorporate an awareness condition on justification. Unlike traditional forms of internalism, however, epistemological disjunctivism rejects the so-called New Evil Genius thesis. In so far as epistemological disjunctivism rejects the New Evil Genius thesis, it is revisionary. -/- After explaining what epistemological disjunctivism is, and how it relates to traditional forms of epistemic internalism / externalism, I shall argue that the epistemological disjunctivist’s account of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  4. Disjunctivism and Perceptual Knowledge in Merleau-Ponty and McDowell.J. C. Berendzen - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):261-286.
    On the face of it, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s views bear a strong resemblance to contemporary disjunctivist theories of perception, especially John McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism. Like McDowell, Merleau-Ponty seems to be a direct realist about perception and holds that veridical and illusory perceptions are distinct. This paper furthers this comparison. Furthermore, it is argued that elements of Merleau-Ponty’s thought provide a stronger case for McDowell’s kind of epistemological view than McDowell himself provides. Merleau-Ponty’s early thought can be used to develop a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5. Good News for the Disjunctivist About the Bad Cases.Heather Logue - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.
    Many philosophers are skeptical about disjunctivism —a theory of perceptual experience which holds roughly that a situation in which I see a banana that is as it appears to me to be and one in which I have a hallucination as of a banana are mentally completely different. Often this skepticism is rooted in the suspicion that such a view cannot adequately account for the bad case—in particular, that such a view cannot explain why what it’s like to have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  6. Reflective Access, Closure, and Epistemological Disjunctivism.Giada Fratantonio - 2019 - Episteme 1 (online first view):1-21.
    In this paper, I consider the so-called Access Problem for Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012). After reconstructing Pritchard’s own response to the Access Problem, I argue that in order to assess whether Pritchard’s response is a satisfying one, we first need an account of the notion of ‘Reflective Access’ that underpins Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism. I provide three interpretations of the notion of Reflective Access: a metaphysical interpretation, a folk interpretation, and an epistemic interpretation. I argue that none of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. An Ecological Approach to Disjunctivism.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - forthcoming - Synthese (Radical Views on Cognition):1-22.
    In this paper I claim that perceptual discriminatory skills rely on a suitable type of environment as an enabling condition for their exercise. This is because of the constitutive connection between environment and perceptual discriminatory skills, inasmuch as such connection is construed from an ecological approach. The exercise of a discriminatory skill yields knowledge of affordances of objects, properties, or events in the surrounding environment. This is practical knowledge in the first-person perspective. An organism learns to perceive an object by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  80
    Disjunctivism About Intending.Yair Levy - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    The overwhelmingly predominant view in philosophy sees intending as a mental state, specifically a plan-like state. This paper rejects the predominant view in favour of a starkly opposed novel alternative. After criticizing both the predominant Bratman-esque view of intention, and an alternative view inspired by Michael Thompson, the paper proceeds to set out and defend the idea that acting with an intention to V should be understood disjunctively, as (roughy) either one’s V-ing intentionally or one’s performing some kind of failed (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. A Better Disjunctivist Response to the 'New Evil Genius' Challenge.Kegan J. Shaw - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):101-125.
    This paper aims for a more robust epistemological disjunctivism (ED) by offering on its behalf a new and better response to the ‘new evil genius’ problem. The first section articulates the ‘new evil genius challenge’ (NEG challenge) to ED, specifying its two components: the ‘first-order’ and ‘diagnostic’ problems for ED. The first-order problem challenges proponents of ED to offer some explanation of the intuition behind the thought that your radically deceived duplicate is no less justified than you are for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10. The Nyāya Argument for Disjunctivism.Henry Ian Schiller - 2019 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 36 (1):1-18.
    The Nyāya school of classical Indian epistemology defended (by today’s standards) a radical version of epistemic externalism. They also gave arguments from their epistemological positions to an early version of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. In this paper I assess the value of such an argument, concluding that a modified version of the Nyāya argument may be defensible.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. McDowell’s Disjunctivism and Other Minds.Anil Gomes - 2011 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):277-292.
    John McDowell’s original motivation of disjunctivism occurs in the context of a problem regarding other minds. Recent commentators have insisted that McDowell’s disjunctivism should be classed as an epistemological disjunctivism about epistemic warrant, and distinguished from the perceptual disjunctivism of Hinton, Snowdon and others. In this paper I investigate the relation between the problem of other minds and disjunctivism, and raise some questions for this interpretation of McDowell.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  12. Reflective Epistemological Disjunctivism.J. J. Cunningham - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):111-132.
    It is now common to distinguish Metaphysical from Epistemological Disjunctivism. It is equally common to suggest that it is at least not obvious that the latter requires a commitment to the former: at the very least, a suitable bridge principle will need to be identified which takes one from the latter to the former. This paper identifies a plausible-looking bridge principle that takes one from the version of Epistemological Disjunctivism defended by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard, which I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13. Religious Epistemological Disjunctivism.Kegan Shaw - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (3):261-279.
    This paper explores religious belief in connection with epistemological disjunctivism. It applies recent advances in epistemological disjunctivism to the religious case for displaying an attractive model of specifically Christian religious belief. What results is a heretofore unoccupied position in religious epistemology—a view I call ‘religious epistemological disjunctivism’. My general argument is that RED furnishes superior explanations for the sort of ‘grasp of the truth’ which should undergird ‘matured Christian conviction’ of religious propositions. To this end I first (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14. Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Internalist Challenge.Kegan Shaw - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):385-396.
    The paper highlights how a popular version of epistemological disjunctivism labors under a kind of 'internalist challenge'—a challenge that seems to have gone largely unacknowledged by disjunctivists. This is the challenge to vindicate the supposed 'internalist insight' that disjunctivists claim their view does well to protect. The paper argues that if we advance disjunctivism within a context that recognizes a distinction between merely functional and judgmental belief, we get a view that easily overcomes the internalist challenge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. The Bifurcated Conception of Perceptual Knowledge: A New Solution to the Basis Problem for Epistemological Disjunctivism.Kegan Shaw - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2871-2884.
    Epistemological disjunctivism says that one can know that p on the rational basis of one’s seeing that p. The basis problem for disjunctivism says that that can’t be since seeing that p entails knowing that p on account of simply being the way in which one knows that p. In defense of their view disjunctivists have rejected the idea that seeing that p is just a way of knowing that p (the SwK thesis). That manoeuvre is familiar. In (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Is Epistemological Disjunctivism the Holy Grail?Guido Melchior - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 86-2012 90:335-346.
    Pritchard argues that epistemological disjunctivism seems plainly false at first sight, but if it were right, it would represent the “holy grail of epistemology” (1), a view that allows us “to have our cake and eat it too” (3). This prospect motivates Pritchard to develop and defend an account that prima facie might seem simply false. It is disputable whether ED really seems plainly false at first sight or whether this intuition is based on a particular philosophical tradition. However, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. Disjunctivism Unmotivated.Gordon Knight - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2):1-18.
    Many naive realists endorse a negative disjunctivist strategy in order to deal with the challenge presented by the possibility of phenomenologically indistinguishable halucination. In the first part of this paper I argue that this approach is methodologically inconsistent because it undercuts the phenomenological motivation that underlies the the appeal of naive realism. In the second part of the paper I develop an alternative to the negative disjunctivist account along broadly Meinongian lines. In the last section of this paper I consider (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. The Basis-Access Dilemma for Epistemological Disjunctivism.Tammo Lossau - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (2):151-172.
    Epistemological disjunctivists such as Duncan Pritchard claim that in paradigmatic cases of knowledge the rational support for the known propositions is both factive and reflectively accessible. This position faces some problems, including the basis problem – how can our knowledge be based on such strong reasons that seem to leave no room for non-knowledge and therefore presuppose knowledge? – and the access problem – can disjunctivists avoid the implausible claim that we can achieve knowledge through inference from our introspective awareness (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Disjunctivism and Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - In Baron Reed & Diego E. Machuca (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic.
    An overview of the import of disjunctivism to the problem of radical scepticism is offered. In particular, the disjunctivist account of perceptual experience is set out, along with the manner in which it intersects with related positions such as naïve realism and intentionalism, and it is shown how this account can be used to a motivate an anti-sceptical proposal. In addition, a variety of disjunctivism known as epistemological disjunctivism is described, and it is explained how this proposal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. Max Scheler, Cousin of Disjunctivism.Mattia Riccardi - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):443-454.
    Disjunctivism has triggered an intense discussion about the nature of perceptual experience. A question in its own right concerns possible historical antecedents of the position. So far, Frege and Husserl are the most prominent names that have been mentioned in this regard. In my paper I shall argue that Max Scheler deserves a particularly relevant place in the genealogy of disjunctivism for three main reasons. First, Scheler’s view of perceptual experience is distinctively disjunctivist, as he explicitly argues that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. The Diversity of Disjunctivism[REVIEW]Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):304-314.
    In this review article, I introduce a classification of metaphysical and epistemological forms of disjunctivism and critically discuss the essays on disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception, the philosophy of action and epistemology that are published in Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock’s collection 'Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge' (Oxford University Press, 2008).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  22. Kant and McDowell on Skepticism and Disjunctivism.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltburgerlicher Absicht: Akten Des XI. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 761-770.
    This paper is to propose a new form of Kant’s anti-skepticism argument in light of John McDowell’s works on disjunctivism. I first discuss recent debates between McDowell and Crispin Wright on disjunctivism. I argue that Wright wrongly downplays McDowell’s disjunctivism, whose metaphysical claim that our perceptual faculties directly engage in the world has an epistemological implication that should be able to dismiss the skeptic’s imagery as fictitious. However, McDowell does not clearly offer such an argument. I will (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. The Formulation of Disjunctivism About Φ-Ing for a Reason.J. J. Cunningham - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):235-257.
    We can contrast rationalising explanations of the form S φs because p with those of the form S φs because S believes that p. According the Common Kind View, the two sorts of explanation are the same. The Disjunctive View denies this. This paper sets out to elucidate the sense in which the Common Kind Theorist asserts, but the Disjunctivist denies, that the two explanations are the same. I suggest that, in the light of the distinction between kinds of explanation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Duncan Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism[REVIEW]Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (1):138-142.
    Review of Duncan Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  16
    On Envattment - Disjunctivism, Skeptical Scenarios and Rationality.Giovanni Rolla - 2016 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 57 (134):525-544.
    The aim of this paper is two-fold: first, it is intended to articulate theses that are often assessed independently, thus showing that a strong version of epistemological disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge implies a transformative conception of rationality. This entails that individuals in skeptical scenarios could not entertain rational thoughts about their environment, for they would fail to have perceptual states. The secondary aim is to show that this consequence is not a sufficient reason to abandon the variety of (...) presented. The argument for this claim depends on the assessment of rationality attributions to subjects in plausible cases of illusion and some clinical cases of hallucination. RESUMO Este artigo tem dois objetivos: primeiramente, pretende-se articular teses que são frequentemente avaliadas independentemente, mostrando com isso que uma versão robusta do disjuntivismo epistemológico sobre conhecimento perceptual implica uma concepção transformativa da racionalidade. Uma consequência disso é que indivíduos em cenários céticos não poderiam entreter pensamentos racionais sobre o ambiente em que habitam, pois eles não possuiriam estados perceptuais. Em segundo lugar, argumenta-se que a consequência delineada acima não é uma razão suficiente para rejeitar o disjuntivismo tal como apresentado. Esse argumento depende da avaliação de atribuições de racionalidade a indivíduos em casos plausíveis de ilusão e em alguns casos clínicos de alucinação. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Review of Duncan Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism[REVIEW]Declan Smithies - 2013 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  27. Motivating Disjunctivism.Thomas Lockhart - 2012 - In Günter Abel & James Conant (eds.), Rethinking Epistemology Volume 2. De Gruyter. pp. 309-347.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.David Bourget - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):381-408.
    This paper aims to shed new light on certain philosophical theories of perceptual experience by examining the semantics of perceptual ascriptions such as “Jones sees an apple.” I start with the assumption, recently defended elsewhere, that perceptual ascriptions lend themselves to intensional readings. In the first part of the paper, I defend three theses regarding such readings: I) intensional readings of perceptual ascriptions ascribe phenomenal properties, II) perceptual verbs are not ambiguous between intensional and extensional readings, and III) intensional perceptual (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. Exclusive Disjunctivism – Presentness Without Simultaneity in Special Relativity.Nihel Jhou - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):541-550.
    A-theoretic presentness is commonly regarded as non-solipsist and non-relative. The non-solipsism of a non-relative, A-theoretic presentness requires at least two space-like separated things to be present simpliciter together – this co-presentness further implies the global, non-relative, non-conventional simultaneity of them. Yet, this implication clashes with the general view that there is no global, non-relative, non-conventional simultaneity in Minkowski space-time. In order to resolve this conflict, this paper explores the possibility that the non-solipsism of a non-relative, A-theoretic presentness does not require (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. Disjunctivism.Stephan Blatti - 2006 - In A. C. Grayling, A. Pyle & N. Goulder (eds.), Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy. Continuum.
    A theory is disjunctive insofar as it distinguishes genuine from non-genuine cases of some phenomenon P on the grounds that no salient feature of cases of one type is common to cases of the other type. Genuine and non-genuine cases of P are, in this sense, fundamentally different. Those who advocate disjunctivist theories have (for the most part) been concerned with perception and perceptual knowledge. This entry outlines two such theories: the disjunctivist theory of experience (cf. Brewer, Hinton, Martin, Snowdon, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. The Non-Conjunctive Nature of Disjunctivism.Alessandra Tanesini - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):95-103.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  51
    Against Metaphysical Disjunctivism.Pascal Ludwig & Emile Thalabard - 2014 - Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Transparency and Imagining Seeing.Fabian Dorsch - 2013 - In Marcus Willaschek (ed.), Disjunctivism – Disjunctive Accounts in Epistemology and in the Philosophy of Perception. Routledge. pp. 5-32.
    In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well- known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  34. Neither/Nor.Clayton Littlejohn - 2019 - In Casey Doyle, Joe Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. Routledge.
    Abstract: On one formulation, epistemological disjunctivism is the view that our perceptual beliefs constitute knowledge when they are based on reasons that provide them with factive support. Some would argue that it is impossible to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible unless we assume that we have such reasons to support our perceptual beliefs. Some would argue that it is impossible to understand how perceptual experience could furnish us with these reasons unless we assume that the traditional view of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Hallucination as Mental Imagery.Bence Nanay - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (7-8):65-81.
    Hallucination is a big deal in contemporary philosophy of perception. The main reason for this is that the way hallucination is treated marks an important stance in one of the most hotly contested debates in this subdiscipline: the debate between 'relationalists' and 'representationalists'. I argue that if we take hallucinations to be a form of mental imagery, then we have a very straightforward way of arguing against disjunctivism: if hallucination is a form of mental imagery and if mental imagery (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  36. Experience and Introspection.Fabian Dorsch - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. The MIT Press. pp. 175-220.
    One central fact about hallucinations is that they may be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions. Indeed, it has been argued that the hallucinatory experiences concerned cannot— and need not—be characterized in any more positive general terms. This epistemic conception of hallucinations has been advocated as the best choice for proponents of experiential (or “naive realist”) disjunctivism—the view that perceptions and hallucinations differ essentially in their introspectible subjective characters. In this chapter, I aim to formulate and defend an intentional alternative to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  37. Husserl on Hallucination: A Conjunctive Reading.Matt Bower - forthcoming - Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    Several commentators have recently attributed conflicting accounts of the relation between veridical perceptual experience and hallucination to Husserl. Some say he is a proponent of the conjunctive view that the two kinds of experience are fundamentally the same. Others deny this and purport to find in Husserl distinct and non-overlapping accounts of their fundamental natures, thus committing him to a disjunctive view. My goal is to set the record straight. Having briefly laid out the problem under discussion and the terms (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. O argumento da ilusão/alucinação e o disjuntivismo: Ayer versus Austin.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2015 - Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 12:85-106.
    The argument from illusion/hallucination have been proposed many times as supporting the strong conclusion that we are always perceiving directly sense-data. In Sense & Sensibilia, Austin argues that this argument is based on a “mass of seductive (mainly verbal) fallacies”. In this paper, I argue that Austin's argumentative moves to deconstruct the argument from illusion is better understood if they are seen as due to his implicit commitment to some disjunctivist conception of perception. His considerations should be taken as a (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Transparency and Imagining Seeing.Fabian Dorsch - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):173-200.
    In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well- known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  40. Pritchard’s Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:201-219.
    My contribution to the author meets critics discussion of Pritchard's _Epistemological Disjunctivism_. In this paper, I examine some of the possible motivations for epistemological disjunctivism and look at some of the costs associated with the view. While Pritchard's view seems to be that our visual beliefs constitute knowledge because they're based on reasons, I argue that the claim that visual beliefs are based on reasons or evidence hasn't been sufficiently motivated. In the end I suggest that we'll get all (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  41. Naïve Realism and Illusion.Boyd Millar - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:607-625.
    It is well-known that naïve realism has difficulty accommodating perceptual error. Recent discussion of the issue has focused on whether the naïve realist can accommodate hallucination by adopting disjunctivism. However, illusions are more difficult for the naïve realist to explain precisely because the disjunctivist solution is not available. I discuss what I take to be the two most plausible accounts of illusion available to the naïve realist. The first claims that illusions are cases in which you are prevented from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. Stroud, Austin, and Radical Skepticism.Eros Moreira de Carvalho & Flavio Williges - 2016 - Sképsis 14:57-75.
    Is ruling out the possibility that one is dreaming a requirement for a knowledge claim? In “Philosophical Scepticism and Everyday Life” (1984), Barry Stroud defends that it is. In “Others Minds” (1970), John Austin says it is not. In his defense, Stroud appeals to a conception of objectivity deeply rooted in us and with which our concept of knowledge is intertwined. Austin appeals to a detailed account of our scientific and everyday practices of knowledge attribution. Stroud responds that what Austin (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43.  46
    Perception and the Ontology of Causation.Helen Steward - 2011 - In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
    The paper argues that the reconciliation of the Causal Theory of Perception with Disjunctivism requires the rejection of causal particularism – the idea that the ontology of causation is always and everywhere an ontology of particulars (e.g., events). The so-called ‘Humean Principle’ that causes must be distinct from their effects is argued to be a genuine barrier to any purported reconciliation, provided causal particularism is retained; but extensive arguments are provided for the rejection of causal particularism. It is then (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  44.  42
    The Obscure Content of Hallucination.Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves - 2019 - Sofia 8 (1):30-53.
    Michael Tye proposed a way of understanding the content of hallucinatory experiences. Somewhat independently, Mark Johnston provided us with elements to think about the content of hallucination. In this paper, their views are compared and evaluated. Both their theories present intricate combinations of conjunctivist and disjunctivist strategies to account for perceptual content. An alternative view, which develops a radically disjunctivist account, is considered and rejected. Finally, the paper raises some metaphysical difficulties that seem to threaten any conjunctivist theory and to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45.  97
    Unconscious Perception and Perceptual Knowledge.Paweł J. Zięba - 2017 - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception and Observation. Contributions of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium August 6-12, 2017 Kirchberg am Wechsel. Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 301-303.
    It has been objected recently that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported hypothesis that unconscious perception is possible. Because epistemological disjunctivism is plausible only in conjunction with naïve realism (for a reason I provide), the objection reaches it too. In response, I show that the unconscious perception hypothesis can be changed from a problem into an advantage of epistemological disjunctivism. I do this by suggesting that: (i) naïve realism is consistent with the hypothesis; (ii) the contrast (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. In Search of the Holy Grail of Epistemology.Paweł J. Zięba - 2014 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 28:55-74.
    Pritchard calls his epistemological disjunctivism ‘the holy grail of epistemology’. What this metaphor means is that the acceptance of this thesis puts the internalism-externalism debate to an end, thanks to satisfaction of intuitions standing behind both competing views. Simultaneously, Pritchard strongly emphasizes that the endorsement of epistemological disjunctivism does not commit one to metaphysical disjunctivism. In this paper I analyze the formulations and motivations of epistemological disjunctivism presented by Pritchard and McDowell. Then I consider the most (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality.Rolla Giovanni - 2016 - Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 39 (3):5-28.
    Based on Pritchard’s distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë’s actionist account of perceptual consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  52
    Alternatywizm, dysjunktywizm i pluralizm doświadczeniowy.Paweł J. Zięba - 2018 - Studia Humanistyczne AGH 17 (1):7-19.
    The claim currently known as “disjunctivism” is usually interpreted in terms of exclusive disjunction. However, it can be also explicated through the lens of alternative denial. The aim of this paper is to show that the latter interpretation is more accurate. Firstly, it reflects the core of disjunctivism more precisely. Secondly, it reduces metaphysical weight of the claim, thereby making it more plausible.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  50
    Dysjunktywizm i natura percepcyjnej relacji.Paweł Zięba - 2016 - Analiza I Egzystencja 35:87-111.
    This paper surveys selected (though arguably representative) versions of metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism. Although they share a common logical structure, it is hard to find a further common denominator among them. Two main conclusions are: (1) a specific standpoint on the nature of perceptual relation is not such a common denominator, which means that it is very unlikely that all of these views could be refuted with a single objection; (2) contrary to what its name suggests, disjunctivism can (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  77
    Review of John Searle's Book: Seeing Things as They Are. [REVIEW]R. Ros Morales - 2017 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (2):128-133.
    John Searle challenges two main stances about the nature of visual experience: The Traditional View and Disjunctivism. He aims to remove the mistakes of these two stances and to present an alternative view which supports Direct Realism. The first part of this review presents the main theses and arguments of Searle's stance. In the second part, it is argued that Searle's analysis of Disjunctivism is not accurate enough.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 92