Moral Relativism and Perspectival Values

In António Marques & João Sàágua (eds.), Essays on Values and Practical Rationality. Ethical and Aesthetical Dimensions. Bern/New York: pp. 155-174 (2018)
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Abstract
The paper explores the issue of moral relativism in Nietzsche, and tries to argue that Nietzsche's attitude towards moral values does not support a radical relativism according to which since (i) every moral interpretation is relative to a judging perspective, and (ii) an absolute viewpoint is lacking, then (iii) every moral interpretation seems to be as true, valid or justified as the others. On the contrary, Nietzsche's perspectivism leaves space for a rank order among values, whose establishment is considered by Nietzsche as the future task of the philosopher.
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Archival date: 2018-10-23
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References found in this work BETA
Human, All Too Human.Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm & Hollingdale, R. J.
Relativism.Baghramian, Maria & Carter, J. Adam
Nietzsche's New Darwinism.Richardson, John & Nietzsche,
Nietzsche.Richardson, John & Leiter, Brian (eds.)

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