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  1. added 2020-09-17
    El escepticismo ético de Sexto Empírico.Diego E. Machuca - 2006 - Dissertation, Universidad de Buenos Aires
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  2. added 2020-07-21
    Epoch Relativism and Our Moral Hopelessness.Regina Rini - 2019 - In Sophie Grace Chappell & Marcel van Ackeren (eds.), Ethics Beyond the Limits: New Essays on Bernard Williams' Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 168-187.
    When we look back upon people in past societies, such as slaveholders and colonialists, we judge their actions to have been morally atrocious. Yet we should give some thought to how the future will judge us. Here I argue that future people are likely to regard our behavior as no better than that of the past. If these future people are to be believed, then we are morally hopeless; we have little chance of working out the moral truth for ourselves. (...)
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  3. added 2020-07-16
    Sentimentalism Without Relativism.Michael L. Frazer - 2013 - Nomos 53:19-37.
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  4. added 2020-06-06
    Relativism. [REVIEW]Ali Hossein Khani - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly:1-3.
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  5. added 2020-05-22
    Misunderstanding Metaethics: Difficulties Measuring Folk Objectivism and Relativism.Lance S. Bush & David Moss - 2020 - Diametros 17 (64):6-21.
    Recent research on the metaethical beliefs of ordinary people appears to show that they are metaethical pluralists that adopt different metaethical standards for different moral judgments. Yet the methods used to evaluate folk metaethical belief rely on the assumption that participants interpret what they are asked in metaethical terms. We argue that most participants do not interpret questions designed to elicit metaethical beliefs in metaethical terms, or at least not in the way researchers intend. As a result, existing methods are (...)
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  6. added 2020-04-05
    The Virtues of Mestizaje: Lessons From Las Casas on Aztec Human Sacrifice.Noell Birondo - 2020 - APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy 19 (2):2-8.
    Winner of the American Philosophical Association’s 2019 Essay Prize in Latin American Thought | Western imperialism has received many different types of moral-political justifications, but one of the most historically influential justifications appeals to an allegedly universal form of human nature. In the early modern period this traditional conception of human nature—based on a Western archetype, e.g. Spanish, Dutch, British, French, German—opens up a logical space for considering the inhabitants of previously unknown lands as having a ‘less-than-human’ nature. This appeal (...)
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  7. added 2020-02-04
    Evolutionary Debunking and Moral Relativism.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - 2020 - In Martin Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. New York: Routledge. pp. 190-199.
    Our aim here is to explore the prospects of a relativist response to moral debunking arguments. We begin by clarifying the relativist thesis under consideration, and we explain why relativists seem well-positioned to resist the arguments in a way that avoids the drawbacks of existing responses. We then show that appearances are deceiving. At bottom, the relativist response is no less question-begging than standard realist responses, and – when we turn our attention to the strongest formulation of the debunking argument (...)
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  8. added 2019-09-22
    Non-Descriptive Relativism: Adding Options to the Expressivist Marketplace.Matthew Bedke - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:48-70.
    This chapter identifies a novel family of metaethical theories that are non-descriptive and that aim to explain the action-guiding qualities of normative thought and language. The general strategy is to consider different relations language might bear to a given content, where we locate descriptivity (or lack of it) in these relations, rather than locating it in a theory that begins with the expression of states of mind, or locating it in a special kind of content that is not way-things-might-be content. (...)
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  9. added 2019-08-03
    Relativism and Expressivism.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - In Martin Kusch (ed.), Routledge Handbook to Relativism. Routledge.
    Relativism and expressivism offer two different semantic frameworks for grappling with a similar cluster of issues. What is the difference between these two frameworks? Should they be viewed as rivals? If so, how should we choose between them? This chapter sheds light on these questions. After providing an overview of relativism and expressivism, I discuss three potential choice points: their relation to truth conditional semantics, their pictures of belief and communication, and their explanations of disagreement.
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  10. added 2019-07-04
    Між Релятивністю Й Абсолютом.Vira Ageyeva - 2018 - NaUKMA Researh Papers. Literary Studies 1:38-43.
    У статті розглянуто один із аспектів надзвичайно широкого інтертекстуального поля прози Віктора Домонтовича. Поняття зради й відступництва письменник інтерпретує у різних контекстах і в різному історичному антуражі. Зокрема в оповіданні «Апостоли» він своєрідно представляє проблему віри й довіри, вводячи у євангельський сюжет ще й тему знання, роздуми про побутування релігії й віри у добу раціоналізму й скептицизму. Страждаючи від роздвоєності й сумнівів, герої цього письменника згодні відповідати за наслідки лише власного вибору. Домонтович демонструє трагічні наслідки ситуації, коли людина бере на (...)
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  11. added 2019-06-06
    Reflections on Moral Disagreement, Relativism, and Skepticism About Rules.Denis Robinson - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):131-156.
    Part 1 of this paper discusses some uses of arguments from radical moral disagreement—in particular, as directed against absolutist cognitivism—and surveys some semantic issues thus made salient. It may be argued that parties to such a disagreement cannot be using the relevant moral claims with exactly the same absolutist cognitive content. That challenges the absolutist element of absolutist cognitivism, which, combined with the intractable nature of radical moral disagreement, in turn challenges the viability of a purely cognitivist account of moral (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    A Relative Defence: Lacewing A Relative Defence.Michael Lacewing - 2003 - Think 1 (3):71-77.
    Is morality relative? Might what is morally ‘right’ for one culture be morally ‘wrong’ for another? Issue two contained two pieces arguing against this kind of moral relativism. Here, Michael Lacewing suggests that there may be more truth in relativism than was suggested.
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  13. added 2019-06-06
    A Single True Morality? The Challenge of Relativism: Harry Bunting.Harry Bunting - 1996 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 40:73-85.
    Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From such a standpoint it follows that conflicting basic moral principles cannot both be true and that the only moral principles which are binding on rational human agents are those described by the single true morality. However sincerely they may be held, all other moral principles are incorrect. Objectivism is an influential tradition, covering most of the rationalist and naturalist standpoints which have dominated nineteenth and (...)
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  14. added 2019-06-05
    Metaethical Relativism.Stojanovic Isidora - 2017 - In David Plunkett & Tristram McPherson (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Oxford: Routledge. pp. 119-134.
    Although relativism may be said to be one of the oldest doctrines in philosophy, dating back to the teachings of Protagoras in the 5th century B.C., when it comes to contemporary philosophy, there is no consensus on what makes a view qualify as "relativist". The problem is particularly accute in metaethics, since most of the views that up to a decade ago were described as “relativist” would be more accurately described as "contextualist" or even “expressivist” in light of the distinctions (...)
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  15. added 2019-06-05
    Sophism and Moral Agnosticism, or, How to Tell a Relativist From a Pluralist. Torcello - 2011 - The Pluralist 6 (1):87.
    Is it possible to recognize the limits of rationality, and thus to embrace moral pluralism, without embracing moral relativism? My answer is yes; nevertheless, certain anti-foundational positions, both recent and ancient, take a cynical stance toward the possibility of any critical moral judgment, and as such, must be regarded as relativistic.1 It is such cynicism, I argue, whether openly announced or unknowingly implied, that marks the distinction between relativism and pluralism.2 The danger of this cynicism is not so much that (...)
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  16. added 2019-05-31
    Do ‘Objectivist’ Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?Gunnar Björnsson - 2012 - Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.
    Many philosophers think that moral objectivism is supported by stable features of moral discourse and thinking. When engaged in moral reasoning and discourse, people behave ‘as if’ objectivism were correct, and the seemingly most straightforward way of making sense of this is to assume that objectivism is correct; this is how we think that such behavior is explained in paradigmatically objectivist domains. By comparison, relativist, error-theoretic or non-cognitivist accounts of this behavior seem contrived and ad hoc. After explaining why this (...)
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  17. added 2019-03-27
    Il relativismo etico fra antropologia culturale e filosofia analitica.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2007 - In I. Tolomio (ed.), Rileggere l'etica tra contingenza e principi. Padova, Italy: CLUEP. pp. 15-46.
    I intend to: a) clarify the origins and de facto meanings of the term relativism; b) reconstruct the reasons for the birth of the thesis named “cultural relativism”; d) reconstruct ethical implications of the above thesis; c) revisit the recent discussion between universalists and particularists in the light of the idea of cultural relativism.. -/- 1.Prescriptive Moral Relativism: “everybody is justified in acting in the way imposed by criteria accepted by the group he belongs to”. Universalism: there are at least (...)
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  18. added 2019-03-07
    Moral Relativism and Perspectival Values.Pietro Gori & Paolo Stellino - 2018 - In António Marques & João Sàágua (eds.), Essays on Values and Practical Rationality. Ethical and Aesthetical Dimensions. Bern/New York: pp. 155-174.
    The paper explores the issue of moral relativism in Nietzsche, and tries to argue that Nietzsche's attitude towards moral values does not support a radical relativism according to which since (i) every moral interpretation is relative to a judging perspective, and (ii) an absolute viewpoint is lacking, then (iii) every moral interpretation seems to be as true, valid or justified as the others. On the contrary, Nietzsche's perspectivism leaves space for a rank order among values, whose establishment is considered by (...)
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  19. added 2019-03-06
    Folk Moral Relativism.Hagop Sarkissian, John J. Park, David Tien, Jennifer Wright & Joshua Knobe - 2014 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy: Volume 2. New York, NY, USA: pp. 169-192.
    It has often been suggested that people’s ordinary folk understanding of morality involves a rejection of moral relativism and a belief in objective moral truths. The results of six studies call this claim into question. Participants did offer apparently objectivist intuitions when confronted with questions about individuals from their own culture, but they offered increasingly relativist intuitions as they were confronted with questions about individuals from increasingly different cultures or ways of life. In light of these data, the authors hypothesize (...)
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  20. added 2019-02-28
    Review of Foundations for Moral Relativism. [REVIEW]Hagop Sarkissian - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (1):116-119.
    Review of David Velleman's Foundations for Moral Relativism.
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  21. added 2018-08-28
    Constructivism, Intersubjectivity, Provability, and Triviality.Andrea Guardo - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):515-527.
    Sharon Street defines her constructivism about practical reasons as the view that whether something is a reason to do a certain thing for a given agent depends on that agent’s normative point of view. However, Street has also maintained that there is a judgment about practical reasons which is true relative to every possible normative point of view, namely constructivism itself. I show that the latter thesis is inconsistent with Street’s own constructivism about epistemic reasons and discuss some consequences of (...)
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  22. added 2018-08-14
    Review of C. Rovane, The Metaphysics and Ethics of Relativism (Harvard University Press, 2013). [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (4):463-466.
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  23. added 2017-11-12
    Why Insights in Evolutionary Moral Psychology Help Resolve Long-Standing Meta-Ethical Questions.Uri Harris - manuscript
    In this brief paper, I present some basic arguments for why insights in moral psychology, especially the work of Jonathan Haidt and others in Moral Foundations Theory, points towards a resolution of long-standing meta-ethical questions.
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  24. added 2017-07-14
    Multiculturalism: A Challenge to Two Myths of Liberalism.Shelley M. Park & Michelle LaRocque - 1995 - Race, Gender and Class 3 (1):27-48.
    This paper sketches a brief account of multiculturalism in order to distinguish it from other positions that have been under attack recently. Following this, we address two prevalent and diametrically opposed criticisms of multiculturalism, namely, that multiculturalism is relativistic, on the one hand, and that it is absolutist, on the other. Both of these criticisms, we argue, simply mask liberal democratic theory's myth- begotten attempt to resolve the tension between the one and the many. Multiculturalism challenges the myths of meritocracy (...)
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  25. added 2017-04-13
    O Perspectivismo Moral Nietzschiano.Pietro Gori & Paolo Stellino - 2014 - Cadernos Nietzsche 34:101-129.
    Contrary to what a superficial reading of Nietzsche might suggest, Nietzsche’s perspectivism is only apparently limited to the theoretical sphere. In fact, Nietzsche also relates perspectivism with his analysis of values and, more in general, with his critique of morality. The aim of the present paper is to present an overview of what might be called Nietzsche’s “moral perspectivism”. In order to answer the question about what kind of practical philosophy derives from Nietzsche’s perspectivism, we shall focus the attention on (...)
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  26. added 2015-10-07
    HOMOSEXUALITY IN FRIEDRICK NIETZSCHE's MORAL RELATIVISM.Onyenuru OkechukwuP - manuscript
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  27. added 2015-10-07
    Towards Enforceable Bans on Illicit Businesses: From Moral Relativism to Human Rights.Edmund F. Byrne - 2014 - Journal of Business Ethics 119 (1):119-130.
    Many scholars and activists favor banning illicit businesses, especially given that such businesses constitute a large part of the global economy. But these businesses are commonly operated as if they are subject only to the ethical norms their management chooses to recognize, and as a result they sometimes harm innocent people. This can happen in part because there are no effective legal constraints on illicit businesses, and in part because it seems theoretically impossible to dispose definitively of arguments that support (...)
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  28. added 2015-09-30
    The Sources of Relativism.Kirk Ludwig - 2015 - Ethics 126 (1):175-195.
    This is a review essay on Carol Rovane's book The Metaphysics and Ethics of Relativism. I outline the main line of argument, clarify the central claim, raise some questions about some of the arguments, and suggest some limits on the extent to which one could see another's views as right but not accept them.
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  29. added 2015-04-05
    Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.Gilbert Harman & Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1996 - Philosophy 71 (278):622-624.
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  30. added 2015-03-23
    What is Moral Relativism?Gilbert Harman - 1978 - In A. I. Goldman & I. Kim (eds.), Values and Morals. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 143--161.
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  31. added 2014-09-17
    Le relativisme moral et le projet de coopération épistémique.François Schroeter - 2009 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (1):4-19.
    Cet article examine de façon critique certaines des récentes tentatives de défendre une position relativiste en métaéthique. Les adeptes du relativisme ont tenté avec beaucoup d’ingéniosité de montrer comment leur position peut soit accepter soit invalider l’intuition selon laquelle nous parlons tous de la même chose quand nous utilisons le vocabulaire moral. Mon argument cherche à établir qu’ils ont ce faisant négligé l’une des fonctions centrales de notre discours moral : créer un forum favorisant la coopération épistémique dans le but (...)
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  32. added 2014-09-08
    Relativism and the Metaphysics of Value.Daan Evers - manuscript
    I argue that relativists about evaluative language face some of the same objections as non-naturalists in ethics. If these objections are powerful, there is reason to doubt the existence of relative evaluative states of affairs. In they do not exist, then relativism leads to an error theory. This is unattractive, as the position was specifically designed to preserve the truth of many evaluative claims.
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  33. added 2014-04-09
    Review of David Wong, Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism (OUP, 2006). [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2009 - Philosophy in Review 29 (2):148-150.
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  34. added 2014-04-02
    Moral Contextualism and the Problem of Triviality.Daan Evers - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):285-297.
    Moral contextualism is the view that claims like ‘A ought to X’ are implicitly relative to some (contextually variable) standard. This leads to a problem: what are fundamental moral claims like ‘You ought to maximize happiness’ relative to? If this claim is relative to a utilitarian standard, then its truth conditions are trivial: ‘Relative to utilitarianism, you ought to maximize happiness’. But it certainly doesn’t seem trivial that you ought to maximize happiness (utilitarianism is a highly controversial position). Some people (...)
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  35. added 2014-04-02
    An Alternative to Relativism.John K. Davis - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):17-37.
    Some moral disagreements are so persistent that we suspect they are deep : we would disagree even when we have all relevant information and no one makes any mistakes. The possibility of deep disagreement is thought to drive cognitivists toward relativism, but most cognitivists reject relativism. There is an alternative. According to divergentism, cognitivists can reject relativism while allowing for deep disagreement. This view has rarely been defended at length, but many philosophers have implicitly endorsed its elements. I will defend (...)
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  36. added 2014-03-30
    The Chinese Rune Argument.Barry Smith - 2001 - Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):66-74.
    Searle’s tool for understanding culture, law and society is the opposition between brute reality and institutional reality, or in other words between: observer-independent features of the world, such as force, mass and gravitational attraction, and observer-relative features of the world, such as money, property, marriage and government. The question posed here is: under which of these two headings do moral concepts fall? This is an important question because there are moral facts – for example pertaining to guilt and responsibility – (...)
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  37. added 2014-03-30
    The Problem for Normative Cultural Relativism.John J. Tilley - 1998 - Ratio Juris 11 (3):272-290.
    The key problem for normative (or moral) cultural relativism arises as soon as we try to formulate it. It resists formulations that are (1) clear, precise, and intelligible; (2) plausible enough to warrant serious attention; and (3) faithful to the aims of leading cultural relativists, one such aim being to produce an important alternative to moral universalism. Meeting one or two of these conditions is easy; meeting all three is not. I discuss twenty-four candidates for the label "cultural relativism," showing (...)
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  38. added 2014-03-13
    Attitudes and Relativism.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):527-544.
    Data about attitude reports provide some of the most interesting arguments for, and against, various theses of semantic relativism. This paper is a short survey of three such arguments. First, I’ll argue (against recent work by von Fintel and Gillies) that relativists can explain the behaviour of relativistic terms in factive attitude reports. Second, I’ll argue (against Glanzberg) that looking at attitude reports suggests that relativists have a more plausible story to tell than contextualists about the division of labour between (...)
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  39. added 2014-03-12
    Justifying Reasons, Motivating Reasons, and Agent Relativism in Ethics.John J. Tilley - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (3):373-399.
    According to agent relativism, each person's moral requirements are relative to her desires or interests. That is, whether a person morally ought to ø depends on what interests or desires she has. Some philosophers charge that the main argument for agent relativism trades on an ambiguity in the term "reason," "reason for action,'' or the like. This paper shows that although the argument for agent relativism may indeed harbor an ambiguity, the ambiguity is no Achilles’ heel. To remove it is (...)
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  40. added 2014-02-18
    Pyrrhonian Relativism.Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 36:89-114.
    This paper argues that Sextus Empiricus’s Pyrrhonism is a form of relativism markedly different from the positions typically referred to by this term. The scholars who have explored the relativistic elements found in Sextus’s texts have claimed that his outlook is not actually a form of relativism, or that those elements are inconsistent with his account of Pyrrhonism, or that he is confusing skepticism with relativism. The reason for these views is twofold: first, when employing the term ‘relativism’ one hardly (...)
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  41. added 2013-11-25
    Racje wewnętrzne, powinności moralne i relatywizm: odpowiedź na polemikę.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2013 - Etyka 46:125-139.
    Tekst Naprawdę jaki jest Bernard Williams utwierdza mnie w przekonaniu, że moje odczytanie tezy internalizmu jest właściwe. Autorka polemiki opiera swą interpretację Williamsa na jednym jego tekście, nie uwzględnia też dyskusji, która toczy się od lat 80. na temat internalizmu, a jej zarzuty dotyczące poprawności mojej argumentacji wynikają z nietrafnego odczytania tego, co napisałem. Podtrzymuję tez tezę, wyrażoną wielokrotnie również przez Williamsa, że racje działania nie są zrelatywizowane względem wiedzy podmiotu. Zgadzam się natomiast z uwagą terminologiczną dotyczącą relatywizmu: wiele stanowisk, (...)
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  42. added 2013-06-04
    On Three Defenses of Sentimentalism.Noriaki Iwasa - 2013 - Prolegomena 12 (1):61-82.
    This essay shows that a moral sense or moral sentiments alone cannot identify appropriate morals. To this end, the essay analyzes three defenses of Francis Hutcheson's, David Hume's, and Adam Smith's moral sense theories against the relativism charge that a moral sense or moral sentiments vary across people, societies, cultures, or times. The first defense is the claim that there is a universal moral sense or universal moral sentiments. However, even if they exist, a moral sense or moral sentiments alone (...)
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  43. added 2012-07-12
    Constructivism and the Error Theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2011 - In Christian Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum.
    This paper presents a comparative evaluation of constructivist and error theoretic accounts of moral claims. It is argued that constructivism has distinct advantages over error theory.
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  44. added 2012-04-25
    Three Kinds of Relativism.Paul Boghossian - 2011 - In Steven Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism. Blackwell.
    The paper looks at three big ideas that have been associated with the term “relativism.” The first maintains that some property has a higher-degree than might have been thought. The second that the judgments in a particular domain of discourse are capable only of relative truth and not of absolute truth And the third, which I dub with the oxymoronic label “absolutist relativism,” seeks to locate relativism in our acceptance of certain sorts of spare absolutist principles. -/- The first idea (...)
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  45. added 2011-02-20
    Folk Moral Relativism.Hagop Sarkissian, John Park, David Tien, Jennifer Wright & Joshua Knobe - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):482-505.
    It has often been suggested that people's ordinary understanding of morality involves a belief in objective moral truths and a rejection of moral relativism. The results of six studies call this claim into question. Participants did offer apparently objectivist moral intuitions when considering individuals from their own culture, but they offered increasingly relativist intuitions considering individuals from increasingly different cultures or ways of life. The authors hypothesize that people do not have a fixed commitment to moral objectivism but instead tend (...)
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  46. added 2010-12-10
    Cultural Relativism.John J. Tilley - 2000 - Human Rights Quarterly 22 (2):501–547.
    In this paper I refute the chief arguments for cultural relativism, meaning the moral (not the descriptive) theory that goes by that name. In doing this I walk some oft-trodden paths, but I also break new ones. For instance, I take unusual pains to produce an adequate formulation of cultural relativism, and I distinguish that thesis from the relativism of present-day anthropologists, with which it is often conflated. In addition, I address not one or two, but eleven arguments for cultural (...)
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  47. added 2010-08-29
    The Standard-Relational Theory of 'Ought' and the Oughtistic Theory of Reasons.Daan Evers - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):131-147.
    The idea that normative statements implicitly refer to standards has been around for quite some time. It is usually defended by normative antirealists, who tend to be attracted to Humean theories of reasons. But this is an awkward combination: 'A ought to X' entails that there are reasons for A to X, and 'A ought to X all things considered' entails that the balance of reasons favours X-ing. If the standards implicitly referred to are not those of the agent, then (...)
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  48. added 2008-12-31
    Two Kinds of Moral Relativism.John Tilley - 1995 - Journal of Value Inquiry 29 (2):187-192.
    Discussions of moral relativism commonly distinguish between normative relativism (NR) and moral judgment relativism (MJR) without highlighting the differences between the two. One significant difference—a difference between normative relativism and the most prevalent type of moral judgment relativism—is not immediately obvious and has not been discussed in print. This paper explains it and draws out some of its philosophical consequences.
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