Presentational Character and Higher Order Thoughts

Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8):103-123 (2015)
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Experiences, by definition, have phenomenal character. But many experiences have a specific type of phenomenal character: presentational character. While both visual experience and conscious thought make us aware of their objects, only in visual experience do objects seem present before the mind and available for direct access. I argue that Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness have a particularly steep hill to climb in accommodating presentational character.
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First archival date: 2015-08-29
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-11)
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