Indistinguishable Senses

Noûs (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Fregeanism and Relationism are competing families of solutions to Frege’s Puzzle, and by extension, competing theories of propositional representation. My aim is to clarify what is at stake between them by characterizing and evaluating a Relationist argument. Relationists claim that it is cognitively possible for distinct token propositional attitudes to be, in a sense, qualitatively indistinguishable: to differ in no intrinsic representational features. The idea of an ‘intrinsic representational feature’ is not, however, made especially clear in the argument. I clarify it here and, having done so, offer reason to doubt the argument. This will put us in a position to draw some lessons about the relation between object-directed and representation-internal aspects of cognitive significance.
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Archival date: 2018-05-14
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References found in this work BETA
The Varieties of Reference.Antony, Louise M.; Evans, Gareth & McDowell, John
Solving Frege's Puzzle.Heck Jr, Richard G.
A Study of Concepts.Hanna, Robert & Peacocke, Christopher

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