AbstractVagueness does not necessarily come in with vague predicates, nor need it be expressed by them , but undoubtedly 'vague predicates' are traditionally in the focus of main stream discussions of vagueness. In her current modal logic presentation and discussion of the Sorites paradox Susanne Bobzien lists among the properties of a Sorites series a rather weak modal tolerance principle governing the 'grey zone' containing the borderline cases of the Sorites series, which later proves crucial for her solution of the Sorites paradox by use of epistemic interpreted modal operators in 1st order modal logic. We suggest (for different research interest) instead a non-modal description of the switch in the grey zone (respecting tolerance), by resort to similarity sequences, thus getting tangent to two other areas of research in the field. Let's say -any way- the Sorites paradox vanishes, the Sorites series does not.
Archival historyArchival date: 2020-08-24
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