A very good reason to reject the buck-passing account

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):287-303 (2014)
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Abstract
This paper presents a new objection to the buck-passing account of value. I distinguish the buck-passing account of predicative value from the buck-passing account of attributive value. According to the latter, facts about attributive value reduce to facts about reasons and their weights. But since facts about reasons’ weights are themselves facts about attributive value, this account presupposes what it is supposed to explain. As part of this argument, I also argue against Mark Schroeder's recent account of the weights of reasons, which purports to explain the weights of reasons in terms of further reasons without circularity. I then argue that if we abandon the buck-passing account of attributive value, it would be ad hoc and unjustifiable to continue to endorse the buck-passing account of predicative value. In short, there seems to be little hope for the buck-passing account in either form. The paper ends by sketching a novel alternative theory according to which reasons are analysed in terms of the attributive value of motives. I suggest that a normative reason to is something that would be a good motive for -ing. At least at first glance, this view has numerous merits and few problems.
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Archival date: 2017-10-17
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References found in this work BETA
On Virtue Ethics.Hursthouse, Rosalind

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Citations of this work BETA
The Right and the Wrong Kind of Reasons.Gertken, Jan & Kiesewetter, Benjamin
Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Zimmerman, Michael J.

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