Distributive and retributive desert in Rawls

Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (2):169-184 (2010)
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Abstract
In this paper I examine John Rawls’s understanding of desert. Against Samuel Scheffler, I maintain that the reasons underlying Rawls’s rejection of the traditional view of distributive desert in A Theory of Justice also commit him to rejecting the traditional view of retributive desert. Unlike Rawls’s critics, however, I view this commitment in a positive light. I also argue that Rawls’s later work commits him to rejecting retributivism as a public justification for punishment.
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Archival date: 2012-10-14
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2010-06-01

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