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  1. Is Forgiveness a Good Thing?Maria Magoula Adamos - 2012 - Forgiveness: Promise, Possibility and Failure.
    While most scholars focus on the advantages of forgiveness, the negative effects of hasty forgiveness have been largely neglected in the literature. In this essay I shall argue that in certain contexts granting forgiveness to a wrongdoer could be morally questionable, and sometimes it could even be morally wrong. Following Aristotle’s view of emotion, and, in particular, his notion of virtuous anger, I shall claim that appropriate, righteous anger is instrumental for justice, and, as a result, inappropriate, or imprudent forgiveness (...)
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  2. What Do We Mean by 'Forgiveness?': Some Answers From the Ancient Greeks.Maria Magoula Adamos & Julia B. Griffin - 2013 - Forgiveness:Philosophy, Psychology, and the Arts.
    There seems to be confusion and disagreement among scholars about the meaning of interpersonal forgiveness. In this essay we shall venture to clarify the meaning of forgiveness by examining various literary works. In particular, we shall discuss instances of forgiveness from Homer’s The Iliad, Euripides’ Hippolytus, and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and we shall focus on the changes that the concept of forgiveness has gone through throughout the centuries, in the hope of being able to understand, and therefore, of being able (...)
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  3. Justice, Claims and Prioritarianism: Room for Desert?Matthew Adler - manuscript
    Does individual desert matter for distributive justice? Is it relevant, for purposes of justice, that the pattern of distribution of justice’s “currency” (be it well-being, resources, preference-satisfaction, capabilities, or something else) is aligned in one or another way with the pattern of individual desert? -/- This paper examines the nexus between desert and distributive justice through the lens of individual claims. The concept of claims (specifically “claims across outcomes”) is a fruitful way to flesh out the content of distributive justice (...)
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  4. A Review of "Disability & Justice: The Capabilities Approach in Practice", by Christopher A. Riddle. [REVIEW]Alexander Agnello - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (3):1-3.
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  5. Critiquing The Veil Of Ignorance.John Altmann - manuscript
    The present work is to be a critique of Rawls’ Veil of Ignorance as well as putting forth an alternative analytical tool when constructing societies known as the L’echelle Naturelle. My paper hopes to argue that inequalities in a society are not only essential in society contrary to Rawls’ Egalitarian ideology, but do in fact contain equality so long as the autonomy of the citizen is fully exercisable. I contend that institutions such as government and their extensions namely the law, (...)
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  6. Redistribution (Substantive Revision).Christian Barry - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    When philosophers, social scientists, and politicians seek to determine the justice of institutional arrangements, their discussions have often taken the form of questioning whether and under what circumstances the redistribution of wealth or other valuable goods is justified. This essay examines the different ways in which redistribution can be understood, the diverse political contexts in which it has been employed, and whether or not it is a useful concept for exploring questions of distributive justice.
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  7. Young on Responsibility and Structural Injustice. [REVIEW]Christian Barry & Luara Ferracioli - 2013 - Criminal Justice Ethics 32 (3):247-257.
    Our aim in this essay is to critically examine Iris Young’s arguments in her important posthumously published book against what she calls the liability model for attributing responsibility, as well as the arguments that she marshals in support of what she calls the social connection model of political responsibility. We contend that her arguments against the liability model of conceiving responsibility are not convincing, and that her alternative to it is vulnerable to damaging objections.
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  8. Who Should Pay for the Damage of the Global Financial Crisis?Christian Barry & Matt Peterson - 2011 - In Ned Dobos Christian Barry & Thomas Pogge (eds.), Global Financial Crisis:The Ethical Issues. Palgrave.
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  9. Why Remittances to Poor Countries Should Not Be Taxed.Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland - 2010 - NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 42 (1):1180-1207.
    Remittances are private financial transfers from migrant workers back to their countries of origin. These are typically intra-household transfers from members of a family who have emigrated to those who have remained behind. The scale of such transfers throughout the world is very large, reaching $338 billion U.S. in 20081—several times the size of overseas development assistance (ODA) and larger even than foreign direct investment (FDI). The data on migration and remittances is too poor to warrant very firm conclusions about (...)
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  10. Why Not Be a Desertist? Three Arguments for Desert and Against Luck Egalitarianism.Huub Brouwer & Thomas Mulligan - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Many philosophers believe that luck egalitarianism captures “desert-like” intuitions about justice. Some even think that luck egalitarianism distributes goods in accordance with desert. In this paper, we argue that this is wrong. Desertism conflicts with luck egalitarianism in three important contexts, and, in these contexts, desertism renders the proper moral judgment. First, compared to desertism, luck egalitarianism is sometimes too stingy: It fails to justly compensate people for their socially valuable contributions—when those contributions arose from “option luck”. Second, luck egalitarianism (...)
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  11. EQUALITY, COMMUNITY, AND THE SCOPE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A PARTIAL DEFENSE OF COHEN's VISION.Dong-Ryul Choo - 2014 - Socialist Studies 10 (1):152-173.
    Luck egalitarians equalize the outcome enjoyed by people who exemplify the same degree of distributive desert by removing the influence of luck. They also try to calibrate differential rewards according to the pattern of distributive desert. This entails that they have to decide upon, among other things, the rate of reward, i.e., a principled way of distributing rewards to groups exercising different degrees of the relevant desert. However, the problem of the choice of reward principle is a relatively and undeservedly (...)
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  12. The Architect and the Ditch Digger.Cruz Cora - manuscript
    “You have an architect and a ditch-digger working together on a construction project. Who gets paid more, and why?” Does a tendency toward abstraction and quantification, a pretense of objectivity, obscure the character, situation and bias from which all economic and political theorems stem? Following the principle that arguments neither arise nor persist in a vacuum, that they live and die by their context and character, we can describe two sorts of response corresponding to two rather timeless worldviews, along with (...)
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  13. Are Rawlsians Entitled to Monopoly Rights?Speranta Dumitru - 2008 - In A. Gosseries, A. Marciano & A. Strowel (eds.), Intelectual Property and Theories of Justice. Palgrave-MacMilan.
    Are intellectual property rights for talented people justified by Rawls’ criteria of justice? In this paper, I argue that Rawls’ theory of justice is ill-equipped to answer this question. Tailored for rival goods and, as a result, centred on the distribution of benefits, it tends to restate questions of justice about unequal rights as questions about economic inequalities. Therefore, it lacks the tools necessary to distinguish among different forms of incentives for talented people. Once social and economic inequalities observe equality (...)
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  14. On Property Theory.David Ellerman - 2014 - Journal of Economic Issues (3):601–624.
    A theory of property needs to give an account of the whole life-cycle of a property right: how it is initiated, transferred, and terminated. Economics has focused on the transfers in the market and has almost completely neglected the question of the initiation and termination of property in normal production and consumption (not in some original state or in the transition from common to private property). The institutional mechanism for the normal initiation and termination of property is an invisible-hand function (...)
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  15. Distributive and Retributive Desert in Rawls.Jake Greenblum - 2010 - Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (2):169-184.
    In this paper I examine John Rawls’s understanding of desert. Against Samuel Scheffler, I maintain that the reasons underlying Rawls’s rejection of the traditional view of distributive desert in A Theory of Justice also commit him to rejecting the traditional view of retributive desert. Unlike Rawls’s critics, however, I view this commitment in a positive light. I also argue that Rawls’s later work commits him to rejecting retributivism as a public justification for punishment.
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  16. Aquinas and Gregory the Great on the Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer.Scott Hill - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    I defend a solution to the puzzle of petitionary prayer based on some ideas of Aquinas, Gregory the Great, and contemporary desert theorists. I then address a series of objections. Along the way broader issues about the nature of desert, what is required for an action to have a point, and what is required for a puzzle to have a solution are discussed.
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  17. Personal Merit and the Politics of Gratitude.Julen Ibarrondo - 2017 - Telos: Revista Iberoamericana de Estudios Utilitaristas 21:39-63.
    Most philosophers recognize that sometimes particular individuals have to be grateful to others who have benefited them in a way that provides reasons for treating them in a differential way. In the same way, I argue, there are cases in which society as such benefits from the actions of a person, which gives rise to collective duties of gratitude that must be expressed at the political and socio-economic levels. The political concern about merit should not be merely instrumental, but also (...)
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  18. The Incompleteness of Luck Egalitarianism.Ryan Long - 2011 - Social Philosophy Today 27:87-96.
    Luck egalitarianism makes a fundamental distinction between inequalities for which agents are responsible and inequalities stemming from luck. I give several reasons to find luck egalitarianism a compelling view of distributive justice. I then argue that it is an incomplete theory of equality. Luck egalitarianism lacks the normative resources to achieve its ends. It is unable to specify the prior conditions under which persons are situated equivalently such that their choices can bear this tremendous weight. This means that luck egalitarians (...)
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  19. What's Wrong with Libertarianism: A Meritocratic Diagnosis.Thomas Mulligan - 2017 - In Jason Brennan, David Schmidtz & Bas van der Vossen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Libertarianism. New York: Routledge. pp. 77-91.
    Some people may think that libertarianism and meritocracy have much in common; that the libertarian's ideal world looks like the meritocrat's ideal world; and that the public policies guiding us to each are one and the same. This is wrong in all respects. In this essay I explain why. -/- After providing an overview of meritocratic justice, I argue that meritocracy is a more compelling theory of distributive justice than libertarianism. Meritocracy better protects the core value of personal responsibility; incorporates (...)
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  20. Against Institutional Luck Egalitarianism.Rekha Nath - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-19.
    Kok-Chor Tan has recently defended a novel theory of egalitarian distributive justice, institutional luck egalitarianism (ILE). On this theory, it is unjust for institutions to favor some individuals over others based on matters of luck. Tan takes his theory to preserve the intuitive appeal of luck egalitarianism while avoiding what he regards as absurd implications that face other versions of luck egalitarianism. Despite the centrality of the concept of institutional influence to his theory, Tan never spells out precisely what it (...)
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  21. ¿Qué es justicia social? Una nueva historia de su significado en el discurso jurídico transnacional.Carlos Andrés Pérez-Garzón - manuscript
    Spanish Abstract: A partir de un análisis desde la historia del derecho, este artículo de investigación busca demostrar la existencia de un significado de justicia social en el discurso jurídico transnacional actual que se resume en el equilibrio de estos tres elementos: Estado Social de Derecho, la dignidad humana y la igualdad material. Con esto, se pretende superar el simple estudio de teorías de filósofos de moda como John Rawls a la hora de abordar el problema de cómo entender y (...)
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  22. Unveiling the Meaning of Social Justice in Colombia.Carlos Andrés Pérez-Garzón - 2018 - Mexican Law Review 10 (2):27-66.
    Through the presentation of a new history of social justice in the global constitutional discourse, this article aims to demonstrate that, despite there is no in Colombia, as in other countries, a constitutional purpose or principle of social justice, the modern notion of justice distributive, also called social justice today, is implicit in the Constitution of 1991 because it enshrined as mandatory rules the three main elements of its meaning in the time in which it was promulgated: the principle of (...)
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  23. Downward Mobility and Rawlsian Justice.Govind Persad - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):277-300.
    Technological and societal changes have made downward social and economic mobility a pressing issue in real-world politics. This article argues that a Rawlsian society would not provide any special protection against downward mobility, and would act rightly in declining to provide such protection. Special treatment for the downwardly mobile can be grounded neither in Rawls’s core principles—the basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle—nor in other aspects of Rawls’s theory. Instead, a Rawlsian society is willing to sacrifice (...)
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  24. Priority and Desert.Matthew Rendall - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):939-951.
    Michael Otsuka, Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey have challenged the priority view in favour of a theory based on competing claims. The present paper shows how their argument can be used to recast the priority view. All desert claims in distributive justice are comparative. The stronger a party’s claims to a given benefit, the greater is the value of her receiving it. Ceteris paribus, the worse-off have stronger claims on welfare, and benefits to them matter more. This can account for (...)
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  25. Wilt Chamberlain Redux: Thinking Clearly About Externalities and the Promises of Justice.Lamont Rodgers & Travis Joseph Rodgers - 2018 - Reason Papers 39 (2):90-114.
    Gordon Barnes accuses Robert Nozick and Eric Mack of neglecting, in two ways, the practical, empirical questions relevant to justice in the real world.1 He thinks these omissions show that the argument behind the Wilt Chamberlain example—which Nozick famously made in his seminal Anarchy, State, and Utopia—fails. As a result, he suggests that libertarians should concede that this argument fails. In this article, we show that Barnes’s key arguments hinge on misunderstandings of, or failures to notice, key aspects of the (...)
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  26. Gerechtigkeit als Versicherung.Lars Roemheld - 2013 - Dissertation, Heidelberg University
    This thesis sketches a justification of a welfare state, defending it against both givers and receivers of redistribution. Following the ideas of Luck Egalitarianism, I argue that righteous wealth is the result of responsible decisions, and that the influence of luck should be minimized. Building on Ronald Dworkin's hypothetical insurance markets, I argue that a welfare system should be conceived of as a personal insurance, not a social luxury. The thesis is written in German.
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  27. What Does a Professional Athlete Deserve?Gottfried Schweiger - 2014 - Prolegomena 13 (1):5-20.
    In this paper I sketch a possible answer to the question of what professional athletes deserve for their sporting activities. I take two different backgrounds into account. First, the content and meaning of desert is highly debated within political philosophy and many theorists are sceptical if it has any value for social justice. On the other hand sport is often understood as a meritocracy, in which all prizes or wins should be solely awarded based on merit. I will distinguish three (...)
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  28. Fairness and the Strengths of Agents' Claims.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (3):347-360.
    John Broome has proposed a theory of fairness according to which fairness requires that agents’ claims to goods be satisfied in proportion to the relative strength of those claims. In the case of competing claims for a single indivisible good, Broome argues that what fairness requires is the use of a weighted lottery as a surrogate to satisfying the competing claims: the relative chance of each claimant's winning the lottery should be set to the relative strength of each claimant's claim. (...)
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  29. Rawls. Vs. Nozick Vs. Kant on Domestic Economic Justice.Helga Varden - 2016 - In Kant and Social Policies. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 93-123.
    Robert Nozick initiated one of the most inspired and inspiring discussions in political philosophy with his 1974 response in Anarchy, State, and Utopia to John Rawls’s 1971 account of distributive justice in A Theory of Justice. These two works have informed an enormous amount of subsequent, especially liberal, discussions of economic justice, where Nozick’s work typically functions as a resource for those defending more right-wing (libertarian) positions, whereas Rawls’s has been used to defend various left-wing stances. Common to these discussions, (...)
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  30. What Do You Mean I Should Take Responsibility for My Own Ill Health?Nicole A. Vincent - 2009 - Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy 1 (1):39-51.
    Luck egalitarians think that considerations of responsibility can excuse departures from strict equality. However critics argue that allowing responsibility to play this role has objectionably harsh consequences. Luck egalitarians usually respond either by explaining why that harshness is not excessive, or by identifying allegedly legitimate exclusions from the default responsibility-tracking rule to tone down that harshness. And in response, critics respectively deny that this harshness is not excessive, or they argue that those exclusions would be ineffective or lacking in justification. (...)
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  31. Equality, Responsibility and Talent Slavery.Nicole A. Vincent - 2006 - Imprints 9 (2):118-39.
    Egalitarians must address two questions: i. What should there be an equality of, which concerns the currency of the ‘equalisandum’; and ii. How should this thing be allocated to achieve the so-called equal distribution? A plausible initial composite answer to these two questions is that resources should be allocated in accordance with choice, because this way the resulting distribution of the said equalisandum will ‘track responsibility’ — responsibility will be tracked in the sense that only we will be responsible for (...)
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