Knowledge for Nothing

In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Pedersen (eds.), New Essays on Entitlement. Oxford University Press (2018)
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Abstract
Let Entitlement Epistemology be the theory of knowledge which says that entitlement—a special kind of unearned warrant to accept or believe—can help us successfully address a range of sceptical arguments. Prominent versions of this theory urge that epistemology should not be concerned with knowledge (and similar externalist states) but rather with justification, warrant, and entitlement (at least insofar as these are conceived of as internalist states). Knowledge does not come first, half-way, or even last in epistemological theorising—rather, it ought to come nowhere. The goal in what follows is two-fold: Firstly, to assess whether this extreme internalist version of Entitlement Epistemology is at all sustainable. (We shall find that it is not.) Secondly, to articulate a version of Entitlement Epistemology which arguably does much better. On the view to be explored, knowledge does not drop out of the epistemological picture: if we allow that there can be warrant for nothing, then there can be knowledge for nothing too.
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First archival date: 2016-10-08
Latest version: 3 (2018-02-13)
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Epistemic Luck.Pritchard, Duncan
Norms of Assertion.Lackey, Jennifer
Mind and World.Price, Huw & McDowell, John

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