Neutralism and the Observational Sorites Paradox

In Ali Abasnezhad & Otavio Bueno (eds.), Synthese Special Edition. Springer (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Neutralism is the broad view that philosophical progress can take place when (and sometimes only when) a thoroughly neutral, non-specific theory, treatment, or methodology is adopted. The broad goal here is to articulate a distinct, specific kind of sorites paradox (The Observational Sorites Paradox) and show that it can be effectively treated via Neutralism.
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First archival date: 2016-10-08
Latest version: 3 (2018-02-18)
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Truth.Horwich, Paul
Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Truth.Horwich, Paul

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