Identity Disorders and Environment. A Phenomenological Model of Delusion

In H. R. Sepp (ed.), Phänomenologie und Ökologie. pp. 132-146 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I am generally concerned with certain mental disorders and the doxastic attitudes that sometimes characterize them. According to recent Anglo-American philosophical studies on this topic, the latter involve beliefs that have somehow “gone wrong”: strange or irrational beliefs and cases of “motivated irrationality”. I aim to focus on pathological and deceptive phenomena such as delusion and self-deception. From a phenomenological perspective, these can also be investigated with regard to their experiential content. Adopting this approach, and starting in particular with the eidetic connection between the living body and its own environment, I will examine disorders of the ecological self. Psychiatric delusion, which is at the core of this examination, is a symptom of a great number of mental disorders, such as Capgras disorder, Cotard disorder and schizophrenia. Integrating dominant (propositional) models of delusion which reduce this pathological phenomenon to a certain kind of belief, I propose an eco-phenomenological understanding of its contours. From this perspective, delusion reveals itself primarily as an illusory experience: a delusional value-perception. In particular, I offer a Schelerian-based description of a peculiar case of delusion: Capgras delusion. People who suffer from Capgras delusion claim that an otherwise familiar individual has been replaced by an impostor. I consider, although in its negative variations, the contextual (rather than internalist) character of this type of delusion.

Author's Profile

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-12-26

Downloads
190 (#85,422)

6 months
74 (#73,790)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?