Related

Contents
71 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 71
  1. Akratic Beliefs and Seemings.Chenwei Nie - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    How does it come about that a person akratically believes that P, while at the same time believing that the available evidence speaks against that P? Among the current accounts, Scanlon offers an intuitive suggestion that one’s seeming experience that P may play an important role in the aetiology of their akratic belief that P. However, it turns out to be quite challenging to articulate what the role of seeming experience is. This paper will offer a novel development of Scanlon’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. The Dark Side of Clarity.Chenwei Nie - forthcoming - Southern Journal of Philosophy:1–15.
    We all have experiences in which it “seems clear” to us that something is true. This kind of clear experience can play significant roles in determining whether we believe something to be true. But what are the significant roles? So far, the literature has focused on optimal cases where a person's clear experience might provide prima facie justification for their belief. This article will develop the hypothesis that, in less optimal cases, these clear experiences can be epistemically damaging. Specifically, it (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. Delusion and evidence.Carolina Flores - 2024 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Routledge.
    Delusions are standardly defined as attitudes that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. But what evidence do people with delusion have for and against it? Do delusions really go against their total evidence? How are the answers affected by different conceptions of evidence? -/- This chapter focuses on how delusions relate to evidence. I consider what delusions-relevant evidence people with delusions have. I give some reasons to think that people typically have evidence for their delusions, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Delusions in Anorexia Nervosa.Stephen Gadsby - 2024 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Routledge.
    Anorexia nervosa involves seemingly irrational beliefs about body size and the value of thinness. Historically, researchers and clinicians have avoided referring to such beliefs as delusions, instead opting for the label ‘overvalued ideas’. I discuss the relationship between the beliefs associated with anorexia nervosa and the distinction between delusions and overvalued ideas, as it is conceived in both European and American psychiatric traditions. In doing so, I question the benefit of applying the concepts of delusion and overvalued idea to anorexia (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. One-factor versus two-factor theory of delusion: Replies to Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof.Chenwei Nie - 2024 - Neuroethics 18 (1):1-5.
    I would like to thank Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof for their stimulating comments on my 2023 paper in Neuroethics. In this reply, I will (1) articulate some deeper disagreements that may underpin our disagreement on the nature of delusion, (2) clarify their misrepresentation of my previous arguments as a defence of the two-factor theory in particular, and (3) finally conduct a comparison between the Maherian one-factor theory and the two-factor theory, showing that the two-factor theory is better supported by evidence.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Rationalism.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2024 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Routledge.
    This chapter introduces the rationalist model of delusions. It begins by presenting John Campbell’s seminal proposal that delusions are caused top-down by pathological Wittgensteinian framework or hinge beliefs. After presenting Campbell’s rationalist account of delusions, the chapter raises and examines prominent objections by Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie as well as by Tim Thornton. The former make an important distinction between the aetiological top-down cognitive part and the epistemological rationalist framework part of Campbell’s account. The thesis that delusions are caused (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Delusion and double bookkeeping.José Eduardo Porcher - 2024 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Routledge. pp. 202-214.
    This chapter connects the phenomenon of double bookkeeping to two critical debates in the philosophy of delusion: one from the analytic tradition and one from the phenomenological tradition. First, I will show how the failure of action guidance on the part of some delusions suggests an argument to the standard view that delusions are beliefs (doxasticism about delusion) and how its proponents have countered it by ascribing behavioral inertia to avolition, emotional disturbances, or a failure of the surrounding environment in (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Monothematic delusions are misfunctioning beliefs.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2024 - Synthese 204 (6):1-26.
    Monothematic delusions are bizarre beliefs which are often accompanied by highly anomalous experiences. For philosophers and psychologists attracted to the exploration of mental phenomena in an evolutionary framework, these beliefs represent—notwithstanding their rarity—a puzzle. A natural idea concerning the biology of belief is that our beliefs, in concert with relevant desires, help us to navigate our environments, and so, in broad terms, an evolutionary story of human belief formation will likely insist on a function of truth (true beliefs tend to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. What’s the Linguistic Meaning of Delusional Utterances? Speech Act Theory as a Tool for Understanding Delusions.Julian Hofmann, Pablo Hubacher Haerle & Anke Https://Orcidorg Maatz - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (7):1–21.
    Delusions have traditionally been considered the hallmark of mental illness, and their conception, diagnosis and treatment raise many of the fundamental conceptual and practical questions of psychopathology. One of these fundamental questions is whether delusions are understandable. In this paper, we propose to consider the question of understandability of delusions from a philosophy of language perspective. For this purpose, we frame the question of how delusions can be understood as a question about the meaning of delusional utterances. Accordingly, we ask: (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. How the Cognitive Science of Belief Can Transform the Study of Mental Health.Eric Mandelbaum & Nicolas Porot - 2023 - JAMA Psychiatry.
    The cognitive science of belief is a burgeoning field, with insights ranging from detailing the fundamental structure of the mind, to explaining the spread of fake news. Here we highlight how new insights into belief acquisition, storage, and change can transform our understanding of psychiatric disorders. Although we focus on monothematic delusions, the conclusions apply more broadly. -/- .
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. Revisiting Maher’s one-factor theory of delusion.Chenwei Nie - 2023 - Neuroethics 16 (2):1-16.
    How many factors, i.e. departures from normality, are necessary to explain a delusion? Maher’s classic one-factor theory argues that the only factor is the patient’s anomalous experience, and a delusion arises as a normal explanation of this experience. The more recent two-factor theory, on the other hand, contends that a second factor is also needed, with reasoning abnormality being a potential candidate, and a delusion arises as an abnormal explanation of the anomalous experience. In the past few years, although there (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  12. On the roles of false belief and recalcitrant fear in anorexia nervosa.Somogy Varga & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2023 - Mind and Language (5):1296-1313.
    The DSM‐5 highlights two essential psychological features of anorexia nervosa (AN): recalcitrant fear of gaining weight and body image disturbance. Prominent accounts grant false beliefs about body weight and shape a central role in the explanation of AN behavior. In this article, we propose a stronger emphasis on recalcitrant fear. We show that such fear can explain AN behavior without the intermediary of a false belief, and thus without the associated explanatory burdens and conceptual difficulties. We illustrate how shifting the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  13. Delusions and Everyday Life.Lucy O'Brien & Douglas Lavin - 2022 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett (ed.), Belief, Imagination, and Delusion. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter aims to get away from the ‘psychological attitude’ approach framing current philosophical discussion of delusion. We ask not what kind of attitude a delusion is – a belief or an imagination? Something else? – as if it were already clear what the ‘content’ of a delusion could be. We aim instead to shift attention to the question of the ‘object’ of delusions. What is delusion of? What is the object of this form of thinking? This focus on a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Delusions and beliefs: a knowledge-first approach.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-7.
    In Delusions and Beliefs, Kengo Miyazono proposes an extended and convincing argument for the thesis that delusions are malfunctional beliefs. One of the key assumptions for this argument is that belief is a biological notion, and that the function of beliefs is a product of evolution. I challenge the thesis that evolutionary accounts can furnish an epistemologically satisfying account of beliefs because evolutionary success does not necessarily track epistemic success. Consequently, also delusions as beliefs cannot be explained in a satisfactory (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. Delusions and madmen: against rationality constraints on belief.Declan Smithies, Preston Lennon & Richard Samuels - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-30.
    According to the Rationality Constraint, our concept of belief imposes limits on how much irrationality is compatible with having beliefs at all. We argue that empirical evidence of human irrationality from the psychology of reasoning and the psychopathology of delusion undermines only the most demanding versions of the Rationality Constraint, which require perfect rationality as a condition for having beliefs. The empirical evidence poses no threat to more relaxed versions of the Rationality Constraint, which only require only minimal rationality. Nevertheless, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  16. Self-treatment of psychosis and complex post-traumatic stress disorder with LSD and DMT—A retrospective case study.Mika Turkia - 2022 - Psychiatry Research Case Reports 1 (2):100029.
    This article describes a case of a teenager with early complex trauma due to chronic domestic violence. Cannabis use triggered auditory hallucinations, after which the teenager was diagnosed with an acute schizophrenia-like psychotic disorder. Antipsychotic medication did not fully resolve symptoms. Eventually the teenager chose to self-medicate with LSD in order to resolve a suicidal condition. The teenager carried out six unsupervised LSD sessions, followed by an extended period of almost daily use of inhaled low-dose DMT. Psychotic symptoms were mostly (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. Delusional Evidence-Responsiveness.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6299-6330.
    Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  18. Inserted Thoughts and the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2021 - In Pascual Angel Gargiulo & Humbert Mesones-Arroyo (eds.), Psychiatry and Neurosciences Update: Vol 4. Springer. pp. 61-71.
    Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M” (Rosenthal 2005, Gennaro 2012). In a previous publication (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. The Certainties of Delusion.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2021 - In Luca Moretti & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Leiden: Brill. pp. 211-229.
    Delusions are unhinged hinge certainties. Delusions are defined as strongly anchored beliefs that do not change in the face of adverse evidence. The same goes for Wittgensteinian certainties. My paper refines the so-called framework views of delusion, presenting an argument that epistemically speaking, considering them to be certainties best accounts for delusions’ doxastic profile. Until now there has been little argument in favour of this position and the original proposals made too extreme predictions about the belief systems of delusional patients. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  20. Delusion, Proper Function, and Justification.Parker Crutchfield - 2020 - Neuroethics 14 (2):113-124.
    Among psychiatric conditions, delusions have received significant attention in the philosophical literature. This is partly due to the fact that many delusions are bizarre, and their contents interesting in and of themselves. But the disproportionate attention is also due to the notion that by studying what happens when perception, cognition, and belief go wrong, we can better understand what happens when these go right. In this paper, I attend to delusions for the second reason—by evaluating the epistemology of delusions, we (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.
    Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M.” I have argued in previous work that a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  22. Identity Disorders and Environment. A Phenomenological Model of Delusion.Roberta Guccinelli - 2020 - In H. R. Sepp (ed.), Phänomenologie und Ökologie. pp. 132-146.
    In this paper, I am generally concerned with certain mental disorders and the doxastic attitudes that sometimes characterize them. According to recent Anglo-American philosophical studies on this topic, the latter involve beliefs that have somehow “gone wrong”: strange or irrational beliefs and cases of “motivated irrationality”. I aim to focus on pathological and deceptive phenomena such as delusion and self-deception. From a phenomenological perspective, these can also be investigated with regard to their experiential content. Adopting this approach, and starting in (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Continuing commentary : challenges or misunderstandings? A defence of the two-factor theory against the challenges to its logic.Chenwei Nie - 2019 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 24 (4):300-307.
    Corlett (2019) raises two groups of challenges against the two-factor theory of delusions: One focuses on weighing “the evidence for … the two-factor theory”; the other aims to question “the logic of the two-factor theory” (p. 166). McKay (2019) has robustly defended the two-factor theory against the first group. But the second group, which Corlett believes is in many aspects independent of the first group and Darby (2019, p. 180) takes as “[t]he most important challenge to the two-factor theory raised (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  24. If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - 2018 - Noûs 54 (3):501-526.
    I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  25. Temporal Delusion: 'Duality' Accounts of Time and Double Orientation to Reality in Depressive Psychosis.M. Moskalewicz - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):163-183.
    This paper argues that 'duality' accounts of time, as exemplified by Henri Bergson's, Edmund Husserl's, and John McTaggart's ideas, parallel the decomposition of temporal experience in depressive psychosis into objective and subjective dimensions of time. The paper also proposes to comprehend the full-fledged depressive temporal delusion, in which the subjective flow of time comes to a standstill, via the idea of a double orientation to reality characteristic of schizophrenic delusions. In the depressive temporal delusion a person claims that time is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. The Doxastic Status of Delusion and the Limits of Folk Psychology.José Eduardo Porcher - 2018 - In Inês Hipólito, Jorge Gonçalves & João G. Pereira (eds.), Schizophrenia and Common Sense: Explaining the Relation Between Madness and Social Values. Cham: Springer. pp. 175–190.
    Clinical delusions are widely characterized as being pathological beliefs in both the clinical literature and in common sense. Recently, a philosophical debate has emerged between defenders of the commonsense position (doxasticists) and their opponents, who have the burden of pointing toward alternative characterizations (anti-doxasticists). In this chapter, I argue that both doxasticism and anti- doxasticism fail to characterize the functional role of delusions while at the same time being unable to play a role in the explanation of these phenomena. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  27. Self-deception in and out of Illness: Are some subjects responsible for their delusions?Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - 2017 - Palgrave Communications 15 (3):1-12.
    This paper raises a slightly uncomfortable question: are some delusional subjects responsible for their delusions? This question is uncomfortable because we typically think that the answer is pretty clearly just ‘no’. However, we also accept that self-deception is paradigmatically intentional behavior for which the self-deceiver is prima facie blameworthy. Thus, if there is overlap between self-deception and delusion, this will put pressure on our initial answer. This paper argues that there is indeed such overlap by offering a novel philosophical account (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. What Makes Delusions Pathological?Valentina Petrolini - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):1-22.
    Bortolotti argues that we cannot distinguish delusions from other irrational beliefs in virtue of their epistemic features alone. Although her arguments are convincing, her analysis leaves an important question unanswered: What makes delusions pathological? In this paper I set out to answer this question by arguing that the pathological character of delusions arises from an executive dysfunction in a subject’s ability to detect relevance in the environment. I further suggest that this dysfunction derives from an underlying emotional imbalance—one that leads (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  29. Depressive Delusions.Magdalena Antrobus & Lisa Bortolotti - 2016 - Filosofia Unisinos 17 (2):192-201.
    In this paper we have two main aims. First, we present an account of mood-congruent delusions in depression (hereafter, depressive delusions). We propose that depressive delusions constitute acknowledgements of self-related beliefs acquired as a result of a negatively biased learning process. Second, we argue that depressive delusions have the potential for psychological and epistemic benefits despite their obvious epistemic and psychological costs. We suggest that depressive delusions play an important role in preserving a person’s overall coherence and narrative identity at (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  30. Making Sense of the Cotard Syndrome: Insights from the Study of Depersonalisation.Alexandre Billon - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (3):356-391.
    Patients suffering from the Cotard syndrome can deny being alive, having guts, thinking or even existing. They can also complain that the world or time have ceased to exist. In this article, I argue that even though the leading neurocognitive accounts have difficulties meeting that task, we should, and we can, make sense of these bizarre delusions. To that effect, I draw on the close connection between the Cotard syndrome and a more common condition known as depersonalisation. Even though they (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  31. The Ethics of Delusional Belief.Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):275-296.
    In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  32. (2 other versions)What makes a belief delusional?Lisa Bortolotti, Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Rachel Gunn - 2016 - In I. McCarthy, K. Sellevold & O. Smith (eds.), Cognitive Confusions. Legenda. pp. 37-51.
    In philosophy, psychiatry, and cognitive science, definitions of clinical delusions are not based on the mechanisms responsible for the formation of delusions. Some of the defining features of delusions are epistemic and focus on whether delusions are true, justified, or rational, as in the definition of delusions as fixed beliefs that are badly supported by evidence). Other defining features of delusions are psychological and they focus on whether delusions are harmful, as in the definition of delusions as beliefs that disrupt (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. When people hold weird beliefs and can't give them up: Predictive processing and the case of strange, rigid beliefs.Alexander Kaltenbock - 2016 - Dissertation,
    This paper analyses the phenomenon of strange, rigid beliefs through the lens of predictive processing (PP). By “strange, rigid beliefs” I refer to abstract beliefs about the world for which, according to a rational and scientific worldview, there is no evidence available, yet which people struggle to abandon even when challenged with strong counterarguments or counterevidence. Following recent PP accounts of delusion formation, I show that one explanation for such strangely persistent beliefs can be a breakdown of the predictive machinery (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Delusional Beliefs, Two-Factor Theories, and Bizarreness.Chenwei Nie - 2016 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 11 (2):263-278.
    In order to explain delusional beliefs, one must first consider what factors should be included in a theory of delusion. Unlike a one-factor theory, a two-factor theory of delusion argues that not only anomalous experience (the first factor) but also an impairment of the belief-evaluation system (the second factor) is required. Recently, two-factor theorists have adopted various Bayesian approaches in order to give a more accurate description of delusion formation. By reviewing the progression from a one-factor theory to a two-factor (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  35. Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities.Matthew Parrott - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):271-296.
    The Capgras delusion is a condition in which a person believes that an imposter has replaced some close friend or relative. Recent theorists have appealed to Bayesianism to help explain both why a subject with the Capgras delusion adopts this delusional belief and why it persists despite counter-evidence. The Bayesian approach is useful for addressing these questions; however, the main proposal of this essay is that Capgras subjects also have a delusional conception of epistemic possibility, more specifically, they think more (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  36. Delusion as a Folk Psychological Kind.Jose Eduardo Porcher - 2016 - Filosofia Unisinos 17 (2):212-226.
    In this paper I discuss the scientific respectability of delusion as a psychiatric category. First, I present the essentialist objection to the natural kindhood of psychiatric categories, as well as non-essentialism about natural kinds as a response to that objection. Second, I present a nuanced classification of kinds of kinds. Third, drawing on the claim that the attribution of delusion relies on a folk psychological underpinning, I present the mind-dependence objection to the natural kind status of delusion. Finally, I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. The Classification, Definition, and Ontology of Delusion.José Eduardo Porcher - 2016 - Revista Latinoamericana de Psicopatología Fundamental 19 (1):167-181.
    Although delusion is one of the central concepts of psychopathology, it stills eludes precise conceptualization. In this paper, I present certain basic issues concerning the classification and definition of delusion, as well as its ontological status. By examining these issues, I aim to shed light on the ambiguity of the clinical term ‘delusion’ and its extension, as well as provide clues as to why philosophers are increasingly joining the ranks of psychiatrists, psychologists, and neuroscientists in the effort to come to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38. Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. [REVIEW]Emily Barrett & Cory Wright - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):600–603.
    Lisa Bortolotti (2010), Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press. (Pp. xvii 299. Price L41.99).
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. The Epistemic Innocence of Motivated Delusions.Lisa Bortolotti - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition (33):490-499.
    Delusions are defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. However, in the empirical literature, delusions have been found to have some psychological benefits. One proposal is that some delusions defuse negative emotions and protect one from low self-esteem by allowing motivational influences on belief formation. In this paper I focus on delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function (motivated delusions) and argue that some of their psychological benefits can convert into epistemic ones. Notwithstanding their epistemic costs, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  40. Somatoparaphrenia, Anosognosia, and Higher-Order Thoughts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2015 - In Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 55-74.
    Somatoparaphrenia is a pathology of self characterized by the sense of alienaton from parts of one’s body. It is usually construed as a kind of delusional disorder caused by extensive right hemisphere lesions. Lesions in the temporoparietal junction are common in somatoparaphrenia but deep cortical regions (for example, the posterior insula) and subcortical regions (for example, the basal ganglia) are also sometimes implicated (Valler and Ronschi 2009). Patients are often described as feeling that a limb belongs to another person and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  41. The Erotetic Theory of Delusional Thinking.Matthew Parrott & Philipp Koralus - 2015 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 20 (5):398-415.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  42. Can Dispositionalism About Belief Vindicate Doxasticism About Delusion?José Eduardo Porcher - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (3):379-404.
    Clinical delusions have traditionally been characterized as beliefs in psychiatry. However, philosophers have recently engaged with the empirical literature and produced a number of objections to the so-called doxastic status of delusion, stemming mainly from the mismatch between the functional role of delusions and that expected of beliefs. In response to this, an appeal to dispositionalism about the nature of belief has been proposed to vindicate the doxastic status of delusion. In this paper, I first present the objections to attributing (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Delírios e os Limites Explanatórios da Psicologia do Senso Comum.José Eduardo Porcher - 2015 - Intuitio 8 (1):185-197.
    Examino a controvérsia sobre como melhor definir o delírio—um sintoma central de patologias como a esquizofrenia e a demência—e apresentarei algumas das principais dificuldades envolvidas em sua caracterização como crenças. A partir disso, tiro conclusões sobre os limites do vocabulário mentalista da dita psicologia do senso comum e sobre a forma como delírios e outros fenômenos elusivos devem ser propriamente caracterizados pela psiquiatria para que uma explicação integrativa destes seja alcançada.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. From the internal lexicon to delusional belief.Max Coltheart - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3/2014):19-29.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45. Rationality, diagnosis and patient autonomy.Jillian Craigie & Lisa Bortolotti - 2014 - Oxford Handbook Psychiatric Ethics.
    In this chapter, our focus is the role played by notions of rationality in the diagnosis of mental disorders, and in the practice of overriding patient autonomy in psychiatry. We describe and evaluate different hypotheses concerning the relationship between rationality and diagnosis, raising questions about what features underpin psychiatric categories. These questions reinforce widely held concerns about the use of diagnosis as a justification for overriding autonomy, which have motivated a shift to mental incapacity as an alternative justification. However, this (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Failing to Self-Ascribe Thought and Motion: Towards a Three-Factor Account of Passivity Symptoms in Schizophrenia.David Miguel Gray - 2014 - Schizophrenia Research 152 (1):28-32.
    There has recently been emphasis put on providing two-factor accounts of monothematic delusions. Such accounts would explain (1) whether a delusional hypothesis (e.g. someone else is inserting thoughts into my mind) can be understood as a prima facie reasonable response to an experience and (2) why such a delusional hypothesis is believed and maintained given its implausibility and evidence against it. I argue that if we are to avoid obfuscating the cognitive mechanisms involved in monothematic delusion formation we should split (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  47. Delusions in the phenomenological perspective.Andrzej Kapusta - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):113-125.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. The Causal Role Argument against Doxasticism about Delusions.Kengo Miyazono & Lisa Bortolotti - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):30-50.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  49. Delusions: between Phenomenology and Prediction. Introduction.Przemysław Nowakowski - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 5 (3):11-16.
    One of the leading and central figures in research on delusions, Max Coltheart, presents and summarises his heretofore work in a short text. Miyazono and Bortolotti present an interesting argument aimed at the charges against the doxastic concept of delusions. Adams, Brown and Friston showcase a predictive-Bayesian concept of delusions. Young criticizes the current changes in the two-factor account of delusions and argues that the role of experience should not be dismissed within it. Kapusta presents an interesting, phenomenological approach to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. When Words Speak Louder Than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion.David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (4):1-18.
    People suffering from severe monothematic delusions, such as Capgras, Fregoli, or Cotard patients, regularly assert extraordinary and unlikely things. For example, some say that their loved ones have been replaced by impostors. A popular view in philosophy and cognitive science is that such monothematic delusions aren't beliefs because they don't guide behaviour and affect in the way that beliefs do. Or, if they are beliefs, they are somehow anomalous, atypical, or marginal beliefs. We present evidence from five studies that folk (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
1 — 50 / 71