View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

27 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. Depressive Delusions.Magdalena Antrobus & Lisa Bortolotti - 2016 - Filosofia Unisinos 17 (2):192-201.
    In this paper we have two main aims. First, we present an account of mood-congruent delusions in depression (hereafter, depressive delusions). We propose that depressive delusions constitute acknowledgements of self-related beliefs acquired as a result of a negatively biased learning process. Second, we argue that depressive delusions have the potential for psychological and epistemic benefits despite their obvious epistemic and psychological costs. We suggest that depressive delusions play an important role in preserving a person’s overall coherence and narrative identity at (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2. The Gene as the Unit of Selection: A Case of Evolutive Delusion: A Case of Evolutive Delusion.Armando Aranda-Anzaldo - 1997 - Ludus Vitalis 5 (9):91-120.
    The unit of selection is the concept of that ‘something’ to which biologists refer when they speak of an adaptation as being ‘for the good of’ something. Darwin identified the organism as the unit of selection because for him the ‘struggle for existence’ was an issue among individuals. Later on it was suggested that, in order to understand the evolution of social behavior, it is necessary to argue that groups, and not individuals, are the units of selection. The last addition (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Delusions as Doxastic States: Contexts, Compartments, and Commitments.Tim Bayne - 2010 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4):329-336.
    Although delusions are typically regarded as beliefs of a certain kind, there have been worries about the doxastic conception of delusions since at least Bleuler’s time. ‘Anti-doxasticists,’ as we might call them, do not merely worry about the claim that delusions are beliefs, they reject it. Reimer’s paper weighs into the debate between ‘doxasticists’ and ‘anti-doxasticists’ by suggesting that one of the main arguments given against the doxastic conception of delusions—what we might call the functional role objection—is based on a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  4. The Epistemic Innocence of Motivated Delusions.Lisa Bortolotti - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition (33):490-499.
    Delusions are defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. However, in the empirical literature, delusions have been found to have some psychological benefits. One proposal is that some delusions defuse negative emotions and protect one from low self-esteem by allowing motivational influences on belief formation. In this paper I focus on delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function (motivated delusions) and argue that some of their psychological benefits can convert into epistemic ones. Notwithstanding their epistemic costs, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  5. In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions.Lisa Bortolotti - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):39-53.
    Here I reply to the main points raised by the commentators on the arguments put forward in my Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2009). My response is aimed at defending a modest doxastic account of clinical delusions, and is articulated in three sections. First, I consider the view that delusions are inbetween perceptual and doxastic states, defended by Jacob Hohwy and Vivek Rajan, and the view that delusions are failed attempts at believing or not-quitebeliefs, proposed by Eric Schwitzgebel and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  6. Psychiatric Classification and Diagnosis. Delusions and Confabulations.Lisa Bortolotti - 2011 - Paradigmi (1):99-112.
    In psychiatry some disorders of cognition are distinguished from instances of normal cognitive functioning and from other disorders in virtue of their surface features rather than in virtue of the underlying mechanisms responsible for their occurrence. Aetiological considerations often cannot play a significant classificatory and diagnostic role, because there is no sufficient knowledge or consensus about the causal history of many psychiatric disorders. Moreover, it is not always possible to uniquely identify a pathological behaviour as the symptom of a certain (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7. The Ethics of Delusional Belief.Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):275-296.
    In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8. Three Challenges From Delusion for Theories of Autonomy.K. W. M. Fulford & Lubomira Radoilska - 2012 - In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press. pp. 44-74.
    This chapter identifies and explores a series of challenges raised by the clinical concept of delusion for theories which conceive autonomy as an agency rather than a status concept. The first challenge is to address the autonomy-impairing nature of delusions consistently with their role as grounds for full legal and ethical excuse, on the one hand, and psychopathological significance as key symptoms of psychoses, on the other. The second challenge is to take into account the full logical range of delusions, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Failing to Self-Ascribe Thought and Motion: Towards a Three-Factor Account of Passivity Symptoms in Schizophrenia.David Miguel Gray - 2014 - Schizophrenia Research 152 (1):28-32.
    There has recently been emphasis put on providing two-factor accounts of monothematic delusions. Such accounts would explain (1) whether a delusional hypothesis (e.g. someone else is inserting thoughts into my mind) can be understood as a prima facie reasonable response to an experience and (2) why such a delusional hypothesis is believed and maintained given its implausibility and evidence against it. I argue that if we are to avoid obfuscating the cognitive mechanisms involved in monothematic delusion formation we should split (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Introduction: What is Confabulation?William Hirstein - 2009 - In Confabulation: Views From Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11. On Thought Insertion.Christoph Hoerl - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):189-200.
    In this paper, I investigate in detail one theoretical approach to the symptom of thought insertion. This approach suggests that patients are lead to disown certain thoughts they are subjected to because they lack a sense of active participation in the occurrence of those thoughts. I examine one reading of this claim, according to which the patients’ anomalous experiences arise from a breakdown of cognitive mechanisms tracking the production of occurrent thoughts, before sketching an alternative reading, according to which their (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  12. Delusions, Illusions and Inference Under Uncertainty.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):57-71.
    Three challenges to a unified understanding of delusions emerge from Radden's On Delusion (2011). Here, I propose that in order to respond to these challenges, and to work towards a unifying framework for delusions, we should see delusions as arising in inference under uncertainty. This proposal is based on the observation that delusions in key respects are surprisingly like perceptual illusions, and it is developed further by focusing particularly on individual differences in uncertainty expectations.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Delusions as Forensically Disturbing Perceptual Inferences.Jakob Hohwy & Vivek Rajan - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):5-11.
    Bortolotti’s Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs defends the view that delusions are beliefs on a continuum with other beliefs. A different view is that delusions are more like illusions, that is, they arise from faulty perception. This view, which is not targeted by the book, makes it easier to explain why delusions are so alien and disabling but needs to appeal to forensic aspects of functioning.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  14. Book Review Of: R. T. Carroll, The Skeptic's Dictionary: A Collection of Strange Beliefs, Amusing Deceptions, & Dangerous Delusions. [REVIEW]Gary James Jason - 2006 - Liberty (April):49-52.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Delusions in the Phenomenological Perspective.Andrzej Kapusta - 2015 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):113-125.
    The aim of the article is to present the contemporary concepts of delusions from the phenomenological perspective. The difficulties to define delusions and the examples of delusional disorders, such as delusional mood, Cotard’s syndrome, or Capgras delusions, serve as the point of departure for this analysis. The questions of the phenomenological understanding of delusions are presented in the context of Karl Jaspers' theory of the incomprehensibility of psychotic thinking (primary delusions, delusional mood). The subsequent analysis presents the constraints of contemporary (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Self-Deception and Delusions.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):109-124.
    My central question in this paper is how delusional beliefs are related to self-deception. In section 1, I summarize my position on what self-deception is and how representative instances of it are to be explained. I turn to delusions in section 2, where I focus on the Capgras delusion, delusional jealousy (or the Othello syndrome), and the reverse Othello syndrome.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  17. The Causal Role Argument Against Doxasticism About Delusions.Kengo Miyazono & Lisa Bortolotti - 2015 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):30-50.
    In this paper we consider an argument that is very influential in the philosophical literature, the argument from causal role against the view that delusions are beliefs. The argument has two premises, that many delusions fail to play belief-roles and that playing belief-roles is necessary for a mental state to be a belief. We assess both premises and suggest that they can be resisted.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  18. Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities.Matthew Parrott - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1):axu036.
    The Capgras delusion is a condition in which a person believes that an imposter has replaced some close friend or relative. Recent theorists have appealed to Bayesianism to help explain both why a subject with the Capgras delusion adopts this delusional belief and why it persists despite counter-evidence. The Bayesian approach is useful for addressing these questions; however, the main proposal of this essay is that Capgras subjects also have a delusional conception of epistemic possibility, more specifically, they think more (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. The Erotetic Theory of Delusional Thinking.Matthew Parrott & Philipp Koralus - 2015 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 20 (5):398-415.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. What Makes Delusions Pathological?Valentina Petrolini - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):1-22.
    Bortolotti argues that we cannot distinguish delusions from other irrational beliefs in virtue of their epistemic features alone. Although her arguments are convincing, her analysis leaves an important question unanswered: What makes delusions pathological? In this paper I set out to answer this question by arguing that the pathological character of delusions arises from an executive dysfunction in a subject’s ability to detect relevance in the environment. I further suggest that this dysfunction derives from an underlying emotional imbalance—one that leads (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21. Delusion as a Folk Psychological Kind.José Eduardo Porcher - 2016 - Filosofia Unisinos 17 (2):212-226.
    In this paper I discuss the scientific respectability of delusion as a psychiatric category. First, I present the essentialist objection to the natural kindhood of psychiatric categories, as well as non-essentialism about natural kinds as a response to that objection. Second, I present a nuanced classification of kinds of kinds. Third, drawing on the claim that the attribution of delusion relies on a folk psychological underpinning, I present the mind-dependence objection to the natural kind status of delusion. Finally, I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. The Classification, Definition, and Ontology of Delusion.José Eduardo Porcher - 2016 - Revista Latinoamericana de Psicopatología Fundamental 19 (1):167-181.
    Although delusion is one of the central concepts of psychopathology, it stills eludes precise conceptualization. In this paper, I present certain basic issues concerning the classification and definition of delusion, as well as its ontological status. By examining these issues, I aim to shed light on the ambiguity of the clinical term ‘delusion’ and its extension, as well as provide clues as to why philosophers are increasingly joining the ranks of psychiatrists, psychologists, and neuroscientists in the effort to come to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Can Dispositionalism About Belief Vindicate Doxasticism About Delusion?José Eduardo Porcher - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (3):379-404.
    Clinical delusions have traditionally been characterized as beliefs in psychiatry. However, philosophers have recently engaged with the empirical literature and produced a number of objections to the so-called doxastic status of delusion, stemming mainly from the mismatch between the functional role of delusions and that expected of beliefs. In response to this, an appeal to dispositionalism about the nature of belief has been proposed to vindicate the doxastic status of delusion. In this paper, I first present the objections to attributing (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Delírios e os Limites Explanatórios da Psicologia do Senso Comum.José Eduardo Porcher - 2015 - Intuitio 8 (1):185-197.
    Examino a controvérsia sobre como melhor definir o delírio—um sintoma central de patologias como a esquizofrenia e a demência—e apresentarei algumas das principais dificuldades envolvidas em sua caracterização como crenças. A partir disso, tiro conclusões sobre os limites do vocabulário mentalista da dita psicologia do senso comum e sobre a forma como delírios e outros fenômenos elusivos devem ser propriamente caracterizados pela psiquiatria para que uma explicação integrativa destes seja alcançada.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. The Falsity Criterion in the Definition of Delusion.José Eduardo Porcher - 2014 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 7 (2):72-73.
    Reflection upon and attention to the clinical literature raise a number of difficulties concerning the DSM’s attempt to define delusion. Chief among the contested aspects is what I will call the falsity criterion. Should delusion be defined as being false? The answer is usually a resounding no. I agree - the fact that the DSM still chooses to include the falsity criterion is an unfortunate oversight. However, what concerns me here is the way that most authors, including Maung in a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26. Explaining Schizophrenia: Auditory Verbal Hallucination and Self-Monitoring.Wayne Wu - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (1):86-107.
    Do self-monitoring accounts, a dominant account of the positive symptoms, explain auditory verbal hallucination (AVH)? In this essay, I argue that the account fails to answer many crucial questions any explanation of AVH must address. Where the account provides a plausible answer, I make a case for an alternative explanation: AVH is not the result of a failed control mechanism, namely failed self-monitoring, but the persistent automaticity of auditory experience of a voice. The argument emphasizes the importance of careful examination (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  27. Amending the Revisionist Model of the Capgras Delusion: A Further Argument for the Role of Patient Experience in Delusional Belief Formation.Garry Young - 2015 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):89-112.
    Recent papers on the Capgras delusion have focused on the role played by subpersonal abductive inference in the formation and maintenance of the delusional belief. In these accounts, the delusional belief is posited as the first delusion-related event of which the patient is conscious. As a consequence, an explanatory role for anomalous patient experience is denied. The aim of this paper is to challenge this revisionist position and to integrate subpersonal inference within a model of the Capgras delusion which includes (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography