Do Lefty and Righty Matter More Than Lefty Alone?

Erkenntnis 89 (5):1921-1926 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Derek Parfit argues that fission is prudentially better for you than ordinary death. But is having more fission products with good lives prudentially better for you than having just one? In this paper, we argue that it is. We argue that, if your brain is split and the halves are transplanted into two recipients (who both have good lives), then it is prudentially better for you if both transplants succeed than if only one of them does (other things being equal). This upshot rules out, among other things, that the prudential value of standing in the relation that matters in survival to multiple people is equal to their average well-being.

Author Profiles

Johan E. Gustafsson
University of Texas at Austin
Petra Kosonen
University of Texas at Austin

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-10-17

Downloads
307 (#57,209)

6 months
122 (#36,057)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?