The Unimportance of Being Any Future Person

Philosophical Studies 175 (3):745-750 (2018)
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Abstract

Derek Parfit’s argument against the platitude that identity is what matters in survival does not work given his intended reading of the platitude, namely, that what matters in survival to some future time is being identical with someone who is alive at that time. I develop Parfit’s argument so that it works against the platitude on this intended reading.

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Johan E. Gustafsson
University of York

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