Knowledge-how is the Norm of Intention

Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727 (2018)
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Abstract
It is a widely shared intuition that there is a close connection between knowledge-how and intentional action. In this paper, I explore one aspect of this connection: the normative connection between intending to do something and knowing how to do it. I argue for a norm connecting knowledge-how and intending in a way that parallels the knowledge norms of assertion, belief, and practical reasoning, which I call the knowledge-how norm of Intention. I argue that this norm can appeal to support from arguments which parallel those for other epistemic norms, that it can deal with a number of prima facie problem cases, and that alternative conditions in a norm on intention are implausible.
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Archival date: 2017-05-22
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Knowledge and Action.Hawthorne, John & Stanley, Jason
Elusive Knowledge.Lewis, David

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2017-05-21

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