Naturalism

Abstract

In this section, which forms part of my discussion of the relation and interaction between philosophy and science in the twentieth century, I will show that ‘naturalism’ has played a very crucial role. I consider this role a positive one. In fact, probably, naturalism has constituted the closest relation between philosophy and science. By considering the roots of different types of ‘naturalism’, we shall see that the current debates on naturalism have been an inevitable development. Here also I will show that the current debates are inescapable for most philosophers. By considering some of the different versions of naturalism, I will show that the place of ‘naturalism’ in contemporary philosophy of science is a very crucial one. Finally, I will study the Quinean version of “Epistemology Naturalised”. I will argue that Quine’s version of naturalized epistemology is not as radical as is usually thought. I pursue it through a close reading of Quine’s original text. I will reveal some misunderstandings of Quine’s naturalized epistemology by shedding light on some of the relevant concepts including ‘purely descriptive epistemology’, ‘circularity’, ‘natural science’ and ‘normativity’. To do this, I will first illustrate some of the very different views on that in current debates among philosophers (and particularly philosophers of science) and scientists.

Author's Profile

Sasan Haghighi
Leiden University

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Added to PP
2013-11-19

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