Why There Is a Problem of Normativity and How Should We Find a Solution?

Dialogue 55 (2):108-113 (2016)
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Abstract
Every normative claim is faced with the questions of how and why we should accept it. Jonathan Weinberg et al. think there is no good answer to these questions and call this the "normativity problem." I argue that if we try to posit that there is a problem of normativity, then logically we will fall into circularity – even if these questions of normativity do not have any answer. But there is still a problem that emerges in conflict resolution between normative issues. To avoid circularity, I formulate this problem and call it the "revised problem of normativity." Next, I enumerate and assess probable responses to this revised edition of the problem. Finally, I defend "basic normative issue(s)" as the only valid solution to the revised problem as well as the possibility of a scientific surveyability of it (them).
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Archival date: 2015-09-05
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