J. L. Austin and Literal Meaning

European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):617-632 (2014)
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Abstract
Alice Crary has recently developed a radical reading of J. L. Austin's philosophy of language. The central contention of Crary's reading is that Austin gives convincing reasons to reject the idea that sentences have context-invariant literal meaning. While I am in sympathy with Crary about the continuing importance of Austin's work, and I think Crary's reading is deep and interesting, I do not think literal sentence meaning is one of Austin's targets, and the arguments that Crary attributes to Austin or finds Austinian in spirit do not provide convincing reasons to reject literal sentence meaning. In this paper, I challenge Crary's reading of Austin and defend the idea of literal sentence meaning.
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2012, 2014
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HANJLA-16
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First archival date: 2013-04-24
Latest version: 2 (2019-09-09)
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How to Do Things with Words.Austin, John Langshaw
Literal Meaning.Recanati, Fran├žois

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2011-11-01

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