Autonomism Reconsidered

British Journal of Aesthetics 51 (2):137-147 (2011)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper has three aims: to define autonomism clearly and charitably, to offer a positive argument in its favour, and to defend a larger view about what is at stake in the debate between autonomism and its critics. Autonomism is here understood as the claim that a valuer does not make an error in failing to bring her moral and aesthetic judgements together, unless she herself values doing so. The paper goes on to argue that reason does not require the valuer to make coherent her aesthetic and moral evaluations. Finally, the paper shows that the denial of autonomism has realist commitments that autonomism does not have, and concludes that issues of value realism and irrealism are relevant to the debates about autonomism in ways that have not hitherto been recognized
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HARAR-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2014-08-23
View other versions
Added to PP index
2011-01-08

Total views
512 ( #11,881 of 2,448,214 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #31,767 of 2,448,214 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.