Why Insights in Evolutionary Moral Psychology Help Resolve Long-Standing Meta-Ethical Questions

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Abstract
In this brief paper, I present some basic arguments for why insights in moral psychology, especially the work of Jonathan Haidt and others in Moral Foundations Theory, points towards a resolution of long-standing meta-ethical questions.
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Archival date: 2017-11-12
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2017-11-12

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