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  1. Causal Powers and the Necessity of Realization.Umut Baysan - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (4):525-531.
    Non-reductive physicalists hold that mental properties are realized by physical properties. The realization relation is typically taken to be a metaphysical necessitation relation. Here, I explore how the metaphysical necessitation feature of realization can be explained by what is known as ‘the subset view’ of realization. The subset view holds that the causal powers that are associated with a realized property are a proper subset of the causal powers that are associated with the realizer property. I argue that the said (...)
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  2. The Self-Consciousness Argument : Functionalism and the Corruption of Intentional Content.George Bealer - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter I argue that there is such a barrier created by self-conscious intentional states—conscious intentional states that are about one’s own conscious intentional states. As we will see, however, this result is entirely compatible with a scientific theory of mind, and, in fact, there is an elegant non-reductive framework in which just such a theory may be pursued.
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  3. Dual‐Aspect Monism.Jiri Benovsky - 2016 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (4):335-352.
    In this article, I am interested in dual-aspect monism as a solution to the mind-body problem. This view is not new, but it is somewhat under-represented in the contemporary debate, and I would like to help it make its way. Dual-aspect monism is a parsimonious, elegant and simple view. It avoids problems with “mental causation”. It naturally explains how and why mental states are correlated with physical states while avoiding any mysteries concerning the nature of this relation. It fits well (...)
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  4. Le fonctionnalisme face au problème Des qualia.Ned Block - 1992 - Les Etudes Philosophiques (3):337-369.
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  5. Gasparo Contarini’s Response to Pomponazzi: A Methodic Antidote to Physicalism of the Mind.Paul Richard Blum - 2013 - In A Magyarországi Aquinói Szent Tamás Társaság Közleménei [Communications of the Hungarian Thomas Aquinas Society] 2. pp. 7-20.
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  6. Walking in the Shoes of the Brain: An "Agent" Approach to Phenomenality and the Problem of Consciousness.Dan J. Bruiger - manuscript
    Abstract: Given an embodied evolutionary context, the (conscious) organism creates phenomenality and establishes a first-person point of view with its own agency, through intentional relations made by its own acts of fiat, in the same way that human observers create meaning in language.
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  7. Soul, Body and Survival: The Renaissance of Christian Materialism.Godehard Brüntrup - 2009 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 65 (1):1137 - 1155.
    Article on recent metaphysical accounts of bodily resurrection.
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  8. Zur Kritik des Funktionalismus.Godehard Brüntrup - 2004 - In Wolfgang Köhler & Hans Mutschler (eds.), Ist der Geist berechenbar? Philosophische Reflexionen. WBG. pp. 58-76.
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  9. Fundamentality: Structures, Powers, and a Supervenience Dualism.Rodrigo Cid - manuscript
    If we want to say what “fundamentality” means, we have to start by approaching what we generally see at the empty place of the predicate “____ is fundamental”. We generally talk about fundamental entities and fundamental theories. At this article, I tried to make a metaphysical approach of what is for something to be fundamental, and I also tried to talk a little bit of fundamental incomplete and complete theories. To do that, I start stating the notion of “entity” and (...)
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  10. Philosophy of Mind: Critical Concepts in Philosophy.Sean Crawford (ed.) - 2010 - Routledge.
    v. 1. Foundations -- v. 2. The mind-body problem -- v. 3. Intentionality -- v. 4. Consciousness.
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  11. The Impact and Residue of Cartesian Dualism: The Relevance of Cartesian Skepticism.Cathy Dobson - manuscript
    A concise review of skeptician in the Carterian model with a discussion of the reframing of the Cartesian paradigm by John McDowell in the 20th century.
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  12. Debating Materialism: Cavendish, Hobbes, and More.Stewart Duncan - 2012 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 29 (4):391-409.
    This paper discusses the materialist views of Margaret Cavendish, focusing on the relationships between her views and those of two of her contemporaries, Thomas Hobbes and Henry More. It argues for two main claims. First, Cavendish's views sit, often rather neatly, between those of Hobbes and More. She agreed with Hobbes on some issues and More on others, while carving out a distinctive alternative view. Secondly, the exchange between Hobbes, More, and Cavendish illustrates a more general puzzle about just what (...)
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  13. Leibniz's Mill Arguments Against Materialism.Stewart Duncan - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):250-72.
    Leibniz's mill argument in 'Monadology' 17 is a well-known but puzzling argument against materialism about the mind. I approach the mill argument by considering other places where Leibniz gave similar arguments, using the same example of the machinery of a mill and reaching the same anti-materialist conclusion. In a 1702 letter to Bayle, Leibniz gave a mill argument that moves from his definition of perception (as the expression of a multitude by a simple) to the anti-materialist conclusion. Soon afterwards, in (...)
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  14. Functionalism, Superduperfunctionalism, and Physicalism: Lessons From Supervenience.Ronald P. Endicott - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2205-2235.
    Philosophers almost universally believe that concepts of supervenience fail to satisfy the standards for physicalism because they offer mere property correlations that are left unexplained. They are thus compatible with non-physicalist accounts of those relations. Moreover, many philosophers not only prefer some kind of functional-role theory as a physically acceptable account of mind-body and other inter-level relations, but they use it as a form of “superdupervenience” to explain supervenience in a physically acceptable way. But I reject a central part of (...)
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  15. Nomic-Role Nonreductionism: Identifying Properties by Total Nomic Roles.Ronald P. Endicott - 2007 - Philosophical Topics 35 (1&2):217-240.
    Inspired by recent theories of embodied cognition that emphasize matters of a mind's engineering realization, I introduce "nomic-role nonreductionism" as an alternative to traditional causal-role functionalism in the philosophy of mind. Rather than identify mental properties by a theory that describes their intra-level causal roles via types of inputs, internal states, and outputs, I suggest that one identify mental properties by a more comprehensive theory that also describes inter-level realization roles via types of lower-level engineering, internal mental states, and still (...)
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  16. On the Non-Elimination of Mental States by Adopting a Ruthless-Reductive Stance.João Fonseca - 2008 - Proceedings of the Tilburg-Sidney International Conference on Reduction and the Special Sciences.
    In several places, John Bickle claims that current neuroscientific practice provides actual cellular/molecular reductions of certain mental states. He gives the case study of ‘memory consolidation switch’ as an example where recent findings suggest that this mental state/process can be reduced to the molecular ‘cAMP, PKA, CREB Pathway’. Taking this example, Bickle ‘waves the eleminativist flag’ by claiming that psychological explanations loose their pertinence (or, as he says, ‘became otiose’) once a cellular/molecular explanation replaces them. On this paper I’ll try (...)
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  17. Was Tarski's Theory of Truth Motivated by Physicalism?Greg Frost-Arnold - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):265-280.
    Many commentators on Alfred Tarski have, following Hartry Field, claimed that Tarski's truth-definition was motivated by physicalism—the doctrine that all facts, including semantic facts, must be reducible to physical facts. I claim, instead, that Tarski did not aim to reduce semantic facts to physical ones. Thus, Field's criticism that Tarski's truth-definition fails to fulfill physicalist ambitions does not reveal Tarski to be inconsistent, since Tarski's goal is not to vindicate physicalism. I argue that Tarski's only published remarks that speak approvingly (...)
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  18. Davidson, Dualism, and Truth.Nathaniel Goldberg - 2012 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (7).
    Happy accidents happen even in philosophy. Sometimes our arguments yield insights despite missing their target, though when they do others can often spot it more easily. Consider the work of Donald Davidson. Few did more to explore connections among mind, language, and world. Now that we have critical distance from his views, however, we can see that Davidson’s accomplishments are not quite what they seem. First, while Davidson attacked the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content, he in fact illustrated (...)
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  19. Mind and Brain States.Inês Hipólito - 2015 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 44 (2):102-111.
    With neurons emergence, life alters itself in a remarkable way. This embodied neurons become carriers of signals, and processing devices: it begins an inexorable progression of functional complexity, from increasingly drawn behaviors to the mind and eventually to consciousness [Damasio, 2010]. In which moment has awareness arisen in the history of life? The emergence of human consciousness is associated with evolutionary developments in brain, behavior and mind, which ultimately lead to the creation of culture, a radical novelty in natural history. (...)
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  20. Mind–Brain Identity and Evidential Insulation.Jakob Hohwy - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):261-286.
    Is it rational to believe that the mind is identical to the brain? Identity theorists say it is (or looks like it will be, once all the neuroscientific evidence is in), and they base this claim on a general epistemic route to belief in identity. I re-develop this general route and defend it against some objections. Then I discuss how rational belief in mind–brain identity, obtained via this route, can be threatened by an appropriately adjusted version of the anti-physicalist knowledge (...)
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  21. Metafyzika antiindividualismu.Tomas Hribek - 2008 - Praha, Česko: Filosofia.
    [The Metaphysics of Anti-Individualism] A detailed exploration of the implications of psychological externalism -- in particular Tyler Burge's variety, or what he calls "anti-individualism" -- for the mind-body problem. Based on his anti-individualism, Burge famously rejected materialism, but the ramifications of this argument were not properly examined. I show how he rejects the identity, supervenience, and realization forms of materialism, but that he leaves out the possibility of constitution. In fact, this is not the only option that he admits -- (...)
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  22. Self-Transcendence Correlates with Brain Function Impairment.Bernardo Kastrup - 2017 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 4 (3):33-42.
    A broad pattern of correlations between mechanisms of brain function impairment and self-transcendence is shown. The pattern includes such mechanisms as cerebral hypoxia, physiological stress, transcranial magnetic stimulation, trance-induced physiological effects, the action of psychoactive substances and even physical trauma to the brain. In all these cases, subjects report self-transcending experiences o en described as ‘mystical’ and ‘awareness-expanding,’ as well as self-transcending skills o en described as ‘savant.’ The idea that these correlations could be rather trivially accounted for on the (...)
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  23. Kritik des Naturalismus.Geert Keil - 1993 - de Gruyter.
    Thema der Arbeit ist die Frage, ob eine naturalistische Revolutionierung unseres Selbstverständnisses sprachlich möglich ist. Nach der sprachlichen Möglichkeit wird gefragt, weil nach dem linguistic turn kein Naturalisierungsprogramm ohne den Anspruch auskommt, dass eine Reduktion, Elimination oder Uminterpretation bestimmter Diskurse über den Menschen möglich sei: Die Diskurse über den Menschen sollen an den naturalistischen Diskurs assimiliert werden. Wodurch dieser sich auszeichnet, ist nicht einfach zu bestimmen, doch ist die Intuition nicht von der Hand zu weisen, dass wir über Erfahrungen, die (...)
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  24. Belief as an Act of Reason.Nicholas Koziolek - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):287-318.
    Most philosophers assume (often without argument) that belief is a mental state. Call their view the orthodoxy. In a pair of recent papers, Matthew Boyle has argued that the orthodoxy is mistaken: belief is not a state but (as I like to put it) an act of reason. I argue here that at least part of his disagreement with the orthodoxy rests on an equivocation. For to say that belief is an act of reason might mean either (i) that it’s (...)
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  25. What is 'Mental Action'?Yair Levy - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    There has been a resurgence of interest lately within philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts. After raising some doubts over the viability of various possible ways of drawing the mental act/bodily act distinction, the paper draws some lessons from debates over embodied cognition, which arguably further undermine the credibility of the (...)
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  26. The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview.Kirk Ludwig - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 1--46.
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  27. Reduktionismus, Multirealisierbarkeit Und Höherstufige Näherungen.Holger Lyre - 2012 - In J. Michel G. Münster (ed.), Die Suche nach dem Geist. Mentis.
    Der Aufsatz lotet den zeitgenössischen Reduktionismus aus. Im ersten Teil wird in zentrale Stationen der wissenschaftstheoretischen Debatte um Theorien-Reduktion eingeleitet, wobei das Schaffner-Hooker-Modell und die Bedeutung von Näherungsbegriffen hervorgehoben werden. Der zweite Teil behandelt die multiple Realisierbarkeit als eines der nach wie vor zentralen anti-reduktionistischen Argumente. Die Analyse soll zeigen, dass es sich hierbei nicht um ein einheitliches Phänomen handelt, sondern dass sehr verschiedene Kategorien von Multirealisierbarkeit zu unterscheiden sind. In einem vereinfachten Slogan: multiple Realisierbarkeit ist ihrerseits multirealisiert. Der Aufsatz (...)
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  28. The Epistemology of Meaning.Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald - 2012 - In Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Millikan and Her Critics. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 221--240.
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  29. Causal and Explanatory Autonomy: Comments on Menzies and List.Ausonio Marras & Juhani Yli-Vakkuri - 2010 - In Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 129.
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  30. Causal Exclusion and the Limits of Proportionality.Neil McDonnell - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1459-1474.
    Causal exclusion arguments are taken to threaten the autonomy of the special sciences, and the causal efficacy of mental properties. A recent line of response to these arguments has appealed to “independently plausible” and “well grounded” theories of causation to rebut key premises. In this paper I consider two papers which proceed in this vein and show that they share a common feature: they both require causes to be proportional to their effects. I argue that this feature is a bug, (...)
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  31. 14 A Refutation of Qualia-Physicalism.Michael McKinsey - 2007 - In Michael O'Rourke Corey Washington (ed.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. pp. 469.
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  32. An Argument Against Epiphenomenalism.Jason Megill - 2014 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (2):5 - 17.
    I formulate an argument against epiphenomenalism; the argument shows that epiphenomenalism is extremely improbable. Moreover the argument suggests that qualia not only have causal powers, but have their causal powers necessarily. I address possible objections and then conclude by considering some implications the argument has for dualism.
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  33. The Problem of the Many Minds.Bradley Monton & Sanford Goldberg - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (4):463-470.
    It is argued that, given certain reasonable premises, an infinite number of qualitatively identical but numerically distinct minds exist per functioning brain. The three main premises are (1) mental properties supervene on brain properties; (2) the universe is composed of particles with nonzero extension; and (3) each particle is composed of continuum-many point-sized bits of particle-stuff, and these points of particle-stuff persist through time.
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  34. From Embodied and Extended Mind to No Mind.Vincent C. Müller - 2012 - In Anna Esposito, Antonietta M. Esposito, Rüdiger Hoffmann, Vincent C. Müller & Alessandro Viniciarelli (eds.), Cognitive Behavioural Systems. Springer. pp. 299-303.
    The paper discusses the extended mind thesis with a view to the notions of “agent” and of “mind”, while helping to clarify the relation between “embodiment” and the “extended mind”. I will suggest that the extended mind thesis constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of the notion of ‘mind’; the consequence of the extended mind debate should be to drop the notion of the mind altogether – rather than entering the discussion how extended it is.
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  35. Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind.Kevin Mulligan & Barry Smith - 1985 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (4):627-644.
    This is a review article on Franz Brentano’s Descriptive Psychology published in 1982. We provide a detailed exposition of Brentano’s work on this topic, focusing on the unity of consciousness, the modes of connection and the types of part, including separable parts, distinctive parts, logical parts and what Brentano calls modificational quasi-parts. We also deal with Brentano’s account of the objects of sensation and the experience of time.
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  36. The Problem of Identity in the Identity Theory of Mind.Shanjendu Nath - 2012 - Pratidhwani the Echo (I):115-121.
    The identity theory of mind is advocated and developed by different philosophers beginning with Place, Feigl and Smart. The main thesis of this theory is – states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. Although this theory is better than dualism and Behaviourism, still it has its own problems. This theory leaves many things unexplained with regard to the relation between mind and body, which have been questioned by different thinkers in different periods. (...)
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  37. Physicalism and Big Bang Cosmology.Olof Nebrin - manuscript
    I will discuss the relationship between physicalism and classical Big Bang Cosmology, and argue that the physicalist must hold to the notion that the Universe came into being out of literal nonbeing with no cause, if this person is to hold to classical Big Bang Cosmology. If my argument is sound, then it entails that a physicalist must do this in order to be consistent with Big Bang cosmology, or either give up physicalism. Theism, on the other hand, does not (...)
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  38. Does Integrated Information Lack Subjectivity.Janko Nešić - 2018 - Theoria: Beograd 61 (2):131-145.
    I investigate the status of subjectivity in Integrated Information Theory. This leads me to examine if Integrated Information Theory can answer the hard problem of consciousness. On itself, Integrated Information Theory does not seem to constitute an answer to the hard problem, but could be combined with panpsychism to yield a more satisfying theory of consciousness. I will show, that even if Integrated Information Theory employs the metaphysical machinery of panpsychism, Integrated Information would still suffer from a different problem, not (...)
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  39. Feigl, Sellars, and the Idea of a 'Pure Pragmatics'.Matthias Neuber - manuscript
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  40. Review of The Myth of the Framework and Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem. [REVIEW]Ray Scott Percival - 1997 - New Scientist (10th Dec).
    The myth of the framework, as Popper explains it, is the idea that a rational and fruitful discussion is impossible unless the participants share a common framework of basic assumptions or, at least, unless they have agreed on such a framework for the purposes of the discussion. Popper admits that understanding another mind or language max' be difficult, but if there is a desire to understand another person's aims and problems you can bridge the gap.
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  41. Realism in Mind.Ricardo Restrepo - 2010 - University of Canterbury, New Zealand.
    The thesis develops solutions to two main problems for mental realism. Mental realism is the theory that mental properties, events, and objects exist, with their own set of characters and causal powers. The first problem comes from the philosophy of science, where Psillos proposes a notion of scientific realism that contradicts mental realism, and consequently, if one is to be a scientific realist in the way Psillos recommends, one must reject mental realism. I propose adaptations to the conception of scientific (...)
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  42. Leibniz : Mind-Body Causation and Pre-Established Harmony.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2009 - In Robin Le Poidevin, Peter Simons, Andrew McGonigal & Ross Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge. pp. 109-118.
    Causation was an important topic of philosophical reflection during the Seventeenth Century. This reflection centred around certain particular problems about causation, one of which was the problem of causation between mind and body. The doctrine of the pre-established harmony is Leibniz's response to the problem of causation between mind and body. In this chapter I shall (a) explain the problem of mind-body causation; (b) explain Leibniz's pre-established harmony; and (c) assess his case for it.
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  43. Review of Minds, Causes, and Mechanisms. [REVIEW]Guy Rohrbaugh - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16.
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  44. Self-Consciousness and "Split" Brains: The Minds' I.Elizabeth Schechter - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Elizabeth Schechter explores the implications of the experience of people who have had the pathway between the two hemispheres of their brain severed, and argues that there are in fact two minds, subjects of experience, and intentional agents inside each split-brain human being: right and left. But each split-brain subject is still one of us.
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  45. Die Bedrohung des Geistes. Zu Ernst Troeltschs Kritik des Naturalismus.Gregor Schiemann - 1996 - In G. Raulet (ed.), Die Historismusdebatte in der Weimarer Republik. Peter Lang.
    Troeltschs Auseinandersetzung mit naturwissenschaftlichen Weltbildern in "Der Historismus und seine Probleme" bietet grundlegende, noch heute aktuelle Einsichten in die Erkenntnisbedingungen der Naturwissenschaften. Der Begriff des Naturalismus erhält in diesem Zusammenhang eine ähnliche Mehrdeutigkeit wie der Begriff des Historismus (1). Troeltschs Position zu naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen und ihren Verallgemeinerungen zu Weltbildern findet einen öffentlichen Ausdruck in seiner ambivalenten Haltung gegenüber der nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg aufkommenden Naturwissenschaftskritik. Man kann vermuten, daß diese lebensphilosophisch ausgerichtete Nachkriegsströmung auf die Herausbildung des heutigen Begriffs von Naturwissenschaft (...)
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  46. Erkenntnistheoretischer Dualismus.Tobias Schlicht - 2007 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 10:113-136.
    The dominant position in current debates on the mind-body problem is some version of physicalism, according to which the mind is reducible to the brain and mental phenomena are ultimately explainable in physical terms. But there seems to be an explanatory gap between physicalistic descriptions of neuronal processes and the subjectivity of conscious experience. Some dualists conclude that, therefore, consciousness must be ontologically distinct from any physical properties or entities. This article introduces and argues for a different perspective on these (...)
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  47. Response to Churchland.Aaron Segal & Alvin Plantinga - 2010 - Philo 13 (2):201-207.
    Paul Churchland argues that Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism is unsuccessful and so we need not accept its conclusion. In this paper, we respond to Churchland’s argument. After we briefly recapitulate Plantinga’s argument and state Churchland’s argument, we offer three objections to Churchland’s argument: (1) its first premise has little to recommend it, (2) its second premise is false, and (3) its conclusion is consistent with, and indeed entails, the conclusion of Plantinga’s argument.
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  48. A Unified Theory of Mind-Brain Relationship: Is It Possible?Belbase Shashidhar - 2013 - Open Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):443.
    The mind-body relationship has vexed philosophers of mind for quite a long time. Different theories of mind have offered different points of view about the interaction between the two, but none of them seem free of ambiguities and questions. This paper attempts to use a mathematical model for mind-body relationship. The model may generate some questions to think about this relationship from the viewpoint of operator theory.
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  49. Ryle’s Dispositional Analysis of Mind and its Relevance.Desh Raj Sirswal - 2010 - Review Journal of Philosophy and Social Sciences (April, 2010):103-112.
    The Concept of Mind is the best known and the most important work of Gilbert Ryle. Ryle is thought to have accomplished two major tasks. First, he was seen to have put the final nail in the coffin of Carteisan dualism. Ryle rejects Descartes’ dualistic theory of the relation between mind and body. This doctrine of separation between mind and body is referred by Ryle as “the dogma of the ghost in the machine.” Second, he himself anticipated and suggested dualism’s (...)
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  50. GILBERRT RYLE ON DESCARTES' MYTH.Desh Raj Sirswal - 2007 - K.U. Research Journal of Arts and Humanities (Jan.-Dec.2007):81-86.
    The aim of this paper is to critically examine the Ryle’s conception of “Descartes Myth”. Ryle has two objectives in his book The Concept of Mind: (i) to refute a current philosophical theory about mind. (ii) to substitute at least in blue print, a satisfactory alternative. This paper gives a descriptive analysis of what Ryle calls Descartes-Myth and arguments for it. Conclusion of this paper drawn as he does not succeed in dispelling the myth but only substitutes a peculiar logical (...)
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